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INTRODUCTION
SHAPING GLOBALIZATION FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATION
AND FOOD SECURITY
WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION
In its broadest sense, globalization can be seen as an inherent
part of human experience. Since prehistoric times humans have
been growing in number; interacting with other groups, peace-
fully or not; building larger economic, social, and political
organizations; discovering, using, and sometimes destroying
the resources of the planet; and generating new knowledge and
technologies. That process has led to the emergence of empires,
with the ebb and flow over the centuries of explorers, cru-
saders, missionaries, merchants, and colonists. 
The powerful wave of globalization associated with mod-
ern economic growth in the second half of the 1800s and early
1900s brought the level of world integration to a new peak,
with convergence in commodity and, to a lesser extent, factor
prices. It ended in pain and disintegration with two world wars
and a global economic depression between them.  The world
emerged in the 1950s divided both politically and militarily.
But soon, another pervasive wave of economic, political, and
social integration was rolling forward. That process has been
driven by important changes in the generation, adoption, and
diffusion of technology, including major advances in commu-
nication and transportation. It has been further promoted and
accelerated by economic deregulation and liberalization in
many countries and by the end of the Cold War, which elimi-
nated some of the geopolitical barriers to world integration.
The dramatic increase in world population is also creating
denser economic, social, and environmental linkages.
Here, we take a broad view of globalization to include
three general dimensions, each with economic and non-eco-
nomic components.
First, globalization refers to the multiplication and intensi-
fication of economic, political, social, and cultural linkages
among people, organizations, and countries at the world level.
This notion includes a greater flow of trade and finance; expan-
sion of cross-border communications; greater international
interactions among political groups, nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs), and other members of civil society; and even
increased levels of tourism.
A second dimension is the tendency toward the universal
application of economic, institutional, legal, political, and cul-
tural practices. It is related to the first dimension in that
increased linkages generate a need for common institutions and
rules. Examples in the economic arena include the codification
of trade rules under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT); common approaches to banking supervision, account-
ing, and corporate governance; the convergence toward eco-
nomic policies based on similar standards of monetary and fis-
cal discipline; and reliance on free markets. Recent phenomena
such as the spread of democracy, the increase in the number
and coverage of environmental treaties, and even the contro-
versial possibility of cultural homogenization in the areas of
entertainment, food, and health, are examples of the major non-
economic aspects of this second dimension.
Finally, a third dimension is the emergence of significant spillovers
from the behavior of individuals and societies to the rest of the
world.  Environmental issues such as cross-border pollution and
global warming are inherently international. National economic
crises may lead to financial contagion and ripple effects on the
economies of other countries, requiring coordinated international
responses. Health issues, such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, require
an international approach, as do issues of global crime (for exam-
ple, drug trafficking and money laundering). And there are also the
problems of war and international violence. Again, the dimensions
are linked. Spillovers occur because there are more channels of
interaction. Then, global norms and institutions are required to
provide a framework for coordinating responses.
The economic aspects of globalization usually receive the
most attention. Indeed, some observers tend to equate global-
ization with policies of domestic and international market lib-
eralization, and in the case of developing countries, with inter-
nationally coordinated structural adjustment and stabilization
programs. Here, we take a broader view of both the drivers and
the dimensions of globalization.
DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS AND POLICY PER-
SPECTIVES ON GLOBALIZATION
The analysis of economic integration at the world level has a
long history. Adam Smith and David Ricardo argued that freer
trade—domestic and international—would bring benefits to
individuals and societies. An alternative view, anchored in doc-
trines of economic mercantilism and power politics, empha-
sized the need to accumulate power by the State, and to subor-
dinate and manipulate the economy to that end. From a differ-
ent perspective, the tendency of capitalism to expand world-
wide was articulated by Karl Marx, who saw that expansion as
an implacable and harsh modernizing force of traditional soci-
eties. While Marx shared with classical economists the notion
that the expansion of capital generated benefits, V.I. Lenin,
echoing some of the themes of mercantilism and power poli-
tics, interpreted capitalist expansion as a negative process,
leading inevitably to imperialism and war.
After World War II, the debate on expanding trade and
financial linkages, from the perspective of developing coun-
tries, included different views on the costs and benefits of the
process of integration into world markets. Negative evaluationscame from the literature on colonialism and neocolonialism,
the notion of the secular decline of the terms of trade facing
developing countries in world markets, and the theory of
dependency. Mainstream development economics emphasized
the importance of greater participation in the world economy,
particularly through the flow of finance and trade, which would
improve welfare in developing countries. An expanding subset
of the literature on international economic developments dur-
ing the 1970s focused on multinational corporations, in both
developing and developed countries, with very different views
about the welfare implications of the emergence and expansion
of large international firms. Most of these arguments are being
echoed again in current discussions on globalization.
A broader view of the expansion and intensification of
linkages among countries, encompassing more than just eco-
nomics, came with the idea of interdependence, which high-
lighted the consequences of this phenomenon for the conduct
of foreign policy by the main world powers. Currently, the
debate on globalization and its consequences is far-reaching. It
considers the implications for foreign and domestic policies of
nations, the operation of their social and political institutions,
the functioning of civil society, legal and regulatory frame-
works, the environment, cultural aspects, and conflict and war.
LINKS BETWEEN GLOBALIZATION, POVERTY,
AND FOOD SECURITY
The outline of a framework linking globalization, poverty, and
food security is presented in the figure. Different dimensions of
globalization are listed at the top (first level) and are shown as
affecting the government, civil society, markets, and environ-
ment in developing countries (second level). For instance, glob-
alization may influence the autonomy of government policies
and the availability of public resources. It may affect cultures and
values while allowing new cross-country alliances in civil socie-
ty. It may change the actors in, and the structure of, markets—
domestically and internationally—and may lead to larger envi-
ronmental spillovers. In turn, these changes have implications for
different sectors: agricultural/industrial, rural/urban, food/non-
food (third level). Finally, the different dimensions of globaliza-
tion affect poverty through their impact on economic and non-
economic assets and capabilities, mechanisms for the redistribu-
tion of income, and institutional factors (fourth level). 
Globalization may change the use, and relative value, of the
economic assets and capabilities of the poor. It may also have an
impact on non-economic assets and capabilities, such as social
capital (civil contacts, networks, and institutions) and political
processes that determine the participation and empowerment of
the poor. Important issues in this regard include the protection of
life and personal security, the construction of democratic institu-
tions, accountability and honesty in governance, and the rule of
law. These dimensions mostly determine what Amartya Sen has
called “entitlements and capabilities of the poor.”
Food security is a subset of that general framework. Since
the World Food Conference of 1974, the focus on food securi-
ty has moved from a global and national perspective to the
household and individual, where the problems of malnutrition
and hunger take concrete human expression.  It has been rec-
ognized that the main problem of food security is lack of access
due to poverty rather than any aggregate shortage of supplies.
The 1996 World Food Summit summarized current views and
stated that “food security exists when all people, at all times, have
physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious
food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active
and healthy life.”
Availability and access, however, are only preconditions
for adequate utilization of food. They do not unequivocally
determine the more substantive issue of “nutritional security”
at the level of the individual. In addition to household access to
food and within-household income distribution, other determi-
nants must also be considered. The role of women (education,
household gender roles, and social status) is central, along with
such issues as public health, democracy and good governance,
and peace.
This collection of policy briefs considers different aspects of
the framework presented above. The briefs focus on defining the
aspects of globalization relevant for developing countries and
exploring both the major forces at work and how policies can be
developed to ensure that the process benefits the poor.
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Time horizon. The “medium term” is the instinctive time hori-
zon that Group A uses when thinking, for example, about the
consequences of trade policy. But Group B has concerns that
are both shorter and longer term. Those who work with the
daily reality of poor people’s lives are extremely concerned—
like the poor themselves—about the short-term consequences
of economic policy, which can drive a family into starvation,
force it to sell its assets at fire-sale prices, or pull its children
out of school. For the poor, it is no use being told that things
will pick up again over a five- to 10-year horizon.
There are also those who have a much longer time horizon
than a decade, such as environmental groups, including some with
religious perspectives on stewardship of the earth’s resources. For
them, it is the 50- or 100-year perspective that is important. They
do not see how economic growth can be sustained, given the
earth’s limits, and they see negative consequences of resource
depletion in both the immediate and the long term.
Market structure and power. The implicit framework of Group
A, in thinking through the consequences of economic policy on
distribution and poverty, is that of a competitive market struc-
ture. The instinctive picture that Group B has of market struc-
ture is one riddled with market power. They see the formulation
and implementation of economic policy as influenced by pow-
erful agents, and they see policy consequences filtered through
noncompetitive market structures.
Group A’s immediate response to the suggestion that open-
ness in trade, for example, might hurt the poor in poor countries
is to invoke the basic theorems of trade theory. Opening up an
economy to trade will benefit the more abundant factor because
this factor will be relatively cheap and opening up will increase
demand for this factor overall. Since unskilled labor is the abun-
dant factor in poor countries, opening up will benefit unskilled
labor and, hence, the poor. But the theory breaks down if local
product and factor markets are segmented, either because of poor
infrastructure or because of the local power of middlemen and
moneylenders. These situations are highlighted repeatedly in dis-
cussions about the possible negative consequences of openness.
Group B believes very strongly that increased mobility of
investment capital makes workers in both receiving and send-
ing countries worse off. Such a view is derided by Group A
analysts as being irrational: “How can you say that when capi-
tal leaves the US, it hurts US workers, and when it gets to
Mexico it hurts Mexican workers as well?!”
In a framework with perfectly competitive markets, it is
indeed irrational to suggest that increased mobility of invest-
ment capital makes workers worse off everywhere. But consid-
er a situation where capital and labor in each country bargain
over wages and employment in markets that are not perfectly
competitive. Increasing capital mobility is akin to increasing
the bargaining power of capital relative to labor, so empirical-
ly, workers could end up being worse off in both countries, rel-
ative to capital. This is Group B’s implicit framework, with
added emphasis on the political power of big multinational cor-
porations to influence domestic economic policy.
A seeming disagreement: The “growth” red herring. The word
“growth” also appears controversial, with Group A accusing
Group B of being “anti-growth,” and Group B countering that
Group A believes that “growth is everything.” For all the rhetoric,
there is more agreement here than meets the eye. The problem is
that the word “growth” is used both in its technical sense of “an
increase in real national per capita income” as well as in connot-
ing a particular policy package. This package of “growth-oriented
policies,” as seen by Group A, is perceived as “economic policies
that hurt the poor” by Group B. If viewed in the technical sense,
one would probably find less disagreement on whether growth
helps reduce poverty, although some in Group B would still argue
that this is not the answer over a 50- or 100-year time horizon. The
real differences, as argued, concentrate instead on economic poli-
cies and issues of aggregation, time horizon, and market structure.
The current growth-poverty debate, certainly as presented by some
elements of Group A, misses the point.
CONCLUSION
The argument presented here is that there are key differences in
perspective underlying the seemingly intractable disagree-
ments on aggregation, time horizon, and market structure.
Simply recognizing and understanding this would be one step
toward bridging the gap.
Although more is needed from both sides, the focus here is
on Group A. The message for those at the more academic end of
the Group A spectrum is that explicitly taking these complica-
tions into account is more likely to shift the intellectual frontier
than falling back yet again on conventional analysis. For those at
the more operational and policy end of the spectrum, the mes-
sage is that instead of being closed and inflexible, recognizing
and trying to understand legitimate alternative views on eco-
nomic policy is not only good analytics, it is good politics. 
For further reading see R. Kanbur, “Income Distribution and
Development,” in A. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon, eds.,
Handbook of Income Distribution, Volume 1 (North Holland, 2000),
R. Kanbur, T. Sandler, and K. Morrison, The Future of
Development Assistance (Washington, DC: Overseas Development
Council, 1999), R. Kanbur, “Poverty Reduction Strategies: Five
Perennial Questions,” in R. Culpeper and C. McAskie, eds.,
Towards Autonomous Development in Africa (Ottawa: The North-
South Institute, 1998).
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f the early 1990s raised hopes of a broad-based consensus on
economic policy for growth, equity, and poverty reduction,
the late 1990s dashed them. The East Asian crisis and the
Seattle debacle saw to that. In the year 2000, the governors of
the World Bank, whose mission it is to eradicate poverty, could
meet only under police protection, besieged by those who
believed instead that the institution and the policies it espouses
cause poverty.
How can these two groups, the policymakers and the pro-
testers, who seemingly share the same ends, disagree so much
about the means? And how can they interpret the same objec-
tive reality so differently?
The response so far is for the two groups to question each
other’s motives, commitment, and analytical capacity. But in
this brief, it is argued that at least some of the disagreement can
be understood in terms of differences in perspective on three
key features of economic policy—aggregation, time horizon,
and market structure—an interpretation more conducive to dia-
logue than confrontation.
DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN WHOM AND OVER
WHAT
Disagreements between whom?
• Group A, labeled “Finance Ministry,” includes some who
work in finance ministries in the North and in the South,
many economic analysts, economic policy managers, and
operational managers in international financial institutions
(IFIs) and regional multilateral banks. It includes the
financial press and some academic economists trained in
the Anglo-Saxon tradition.
• Group B, labeled “Civil Society,” includes analysts and
advocates in the full range of nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), as well as people who work in some of the
specialized United Nations agencies, in aid ministries in
the North, and in social-sector ministries in the South.
Among academics, non-economists would tend to fall into
this group.
Groups A and B are better thought of in terms of tendencies
rather than specific individuals.
Disagreements over what? While there are several areas of
agreement between those two groups (such as the impor-
tance of investments in education and health and of interna-
tional public goods for the well-being of the poor), major
disagreements center on a specific set of economic policy
instruments. Group A tends to believe that the cause of
poverty reduction is best served by reduction of fiscal
imbalances, rapid adjustment to lower inflation and external
deficits, liberalization of the financial sector, deregulation
of capital controls, privatization of state-owned enterprises,
and perhaps the strongest unifying factor in this group, rapid
and major opening up of an economy to direct foreign
investment and trade. Group B tends to lean in the opposite
direction on all of these issues, but perhaps the most divisive
areas are trade and openness, and there the rhetoric is fierce.
THE NATURE OF DISAGREEMENTS
Aggregation. Different people instinctively operate at dif-
ferent levels of aggregation when they talk about the conse-
quences of different economic policies.
For example, many in Group A work with poverty
measures that calculate the proportion of people in a country
who fall below a critical level of income/expenditure—the
most commonly used threshold is the famous poverty line of
$1 per person per day.
When Group A analysts showed that the incidence of
poverty in Ghana fell between 1987 and 1991, very few peo-
ple believed it. Group A analysts reacted to this disbelief as
expected—by saying that people did not really understand
the detailed statistical analysis, that those who criticized rep-
resented special interest groups, and so on.
However, there are at least three reasons that the claim that
poverty decreased in Ghana could be questioned:
• First, the indicators used by Group A to measure poverty
do not adequately capture the value of public services,
which may worsen without the effect showing up in meas-
ures of poverty. The claim that poverty has gone down will
ring hollow to those involved in ground-level operations,
as well as to the poor whose lives are made worse by the
decline in public services.
• Second, a national fall in the incidence of poverty often
misses large regional movements in the opposite direction.
For example, in Ghana, between 1987 and 1991, the fall in
national poverty was based on a decline in rural areas and
an increase in urban areas. For an NGO working with street
children in Accra, where poverty had increased, it was cold
comfort to be told that national poverty had gone down.
• Last, while the basic concept of Group A is the incidence
of poverty (a percentage measure), people in Group B
instinctively think of absolute numbers of poor as the
criterion. In Ghana, for example, while the incidence of
poverty was falling at around one percentage point per
year, the total population was growing at almost twice that
rate, with the result that the absolute number of poor
people grew sizably between 1987 and 1991.
RAVI KANBUR
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olicymakers, development organizations, and advocacy
groups often express concern about the impact of global-
ization on poverty. Their concern is understandable, given
globalization’s wide-ranging effects. Globalization may spur
higher income growth due to increased specialization, more
efficient capital and labor flows, and wider diffusion of tech-
nology. But globalization’s impact on poverty hinges on the
extent to which the poor participate in the income-growth
process, something that cannot be guaranteed.  
The post-World War II period has coincided with unparal-
leled increases in global standards of living. In most develop-
ing countries, incomes grew faster in the second half of the
20th century than at any previous time. But living standards
around the world have changed in ways attributable not just to
income growth. Strides in health and longevity, for example,
have resulted from transfers of medical and public-health tech-
nologies, quite independent of growth in incomes. The human
development indices (HDI) of the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) encapsulate achievements in education,
health, and income that are now higher in most developing
countries than they were in the now-developed countries when
they had similar income levels in the 19
th century.
Although historical trends in the correlation between glob-
alization and overall standards of living provide reason for
optimism, recent co-movements in globalization, income
growth, and poverty have been more confounding, fueling pol-
icymakers’ concern. This brief discusses the interplay of some
of the key factors that link globalization to poverty alleviation.
It suggests that effects on poverty, especially in the short term,
are determined by the quality of domestic policy, the state of
the international economy, and the adjustment pains that are
inevitable when trade, investment, and financial barriers are
dismantled. 
TRENDS IN GLOBALIZATION 
The last 50 years have seen a significant reduction in trade bar-
riers, although the proliferation of non-tariff barriers compli-
cates measurement. Restrictions on capital flows have been
lifted as well. The world ratio of trade to non-service gross
domestic product (GDP) jumped from 24 percent in the 1960s
to 58 percent in the 1990s, with the biggest increase in East
Asia (from 9 to 50 percent). Developed countries and Sub-
Saharan Africa have the largest trade/GDP ratios, but all devel-
oping regions showed increases.
International capital flows are less uniform, however, and
are concentrated in developed countries and a few, mostly mid-
dle-income, developing nations. Net capital flows as a share of
GDP were higher in the 1970s than in the 1990s in Africa (4.8
percent compared to 2.0 percent) and Latin America (3.2 per-
cent as compared to 2.5 percent). For Asia, the percentage was
higher in the 1990s until the 1997 Asian financial crisis, with
the final average for the decade (1.4 percent) similar to that in
the 1970s (1.3 percent). In all regions, net flows fell during the
debt crisis of the 1980s. Foreign direct investment emerged in
the 1990s as the largest component of external financing for
many developing countries.
Despite persistent barriers, international labor migration
has grown. From 1965 to 1990, the proportion of the world
labor force that worked outside of their country of birth
increased by half. 
In general, post-World War II globalization has been most
pronounced in industrialized countries, and developing regions
have shown a clear variation in the degree and chronology of
their integration into the global economy.
TRENDS IN GROWTH, INEQUALITY, AND POVERTY
Income growth rates.  Average annual incomes in Africa, Latin
America, and the more populous countries in Asia (China,
India, Indonesia) grew faster in the last five decades than at any
time in the past. Between 1950 and 1996 real GDP per capita
in Africa rose from US$830 to $1,309 (in purchasing-power-
adjusted 1990 prices). In the same period, in East Asia GDP per
capita jumped from $765 to $5,587 and in Latin America from
$2,487 to $5,155. Yet performance within this period was
mixed. Between the 1960s and 1990s, income growth rates fell
in Latin America and the Caribbean (from 5.3 percent to 3.2
percent) and in Sub-Saharan Africa (from 4.9 percent to 1.9
percent), while they increased in East Asia (from 4.6 to 7.3 per-
cent) and South Asia (4.2 to 5.4 percent). Growth rates also
became more volatile. 
Inequality. World income distribution has become more unequal
in the last 150 years. This divergence continues to expand, fueled
almost entirely by increases in between-country inequality: rich
countries, which by most measures are more globalized than the
rest of the world, maintained or increased their lead over poor
countries. While trends in within-country inequality are more
ambiguous, some evidence shows income inequality, especially
in transition countries and some large developing countries, to
have worsened since the 1980s. UNDP’s HDI, on the other hand,
shows global convergence in standards of living, with the gap
between the richest and poorest countries narrowing since 1950.
However, life expectancy, an important component of the index,
has shortened since the 1980s in Sub-Saharan Africa and in some
former republics of the USSR.
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Poverty. The number and percentage of people living in pover-
ty in developing countries declined considerably during the
1960s and 1970s. Data since the mid 1980s show further, but
slower, reductions. While the share of population living on less
than one US dollar a day fell from 28 percent in 1987 to 23 per-
cent in 1998, the absolute number of poor diminished only
slightly (by 9 million persons). If China is excluded, however,
poverty actually increased by about 80 million people in devel-
oping countries. The percentage of underweight children under
five in developing countries, another indicator of absolute
poverty, also declined between 1980 and 2000, from 37.4 per-
cent to 26.7 percent, as did the absolute number.  Yet, the num-
ber of underweight children increased in Sub-Saharan Africa,
while the incidence of undernutrition is still very high there and
in South Asia.   
GLOBALIZATION AND POVERTY: LINKING THE
PIECES
The surge in globalization in the latter half of the 20
th century
went hand-in-hand with significant increases in standards of liv-
ing. While it is difficult to separate the effects of globalization on
poverty from the effects of technological progress or domestic
policies, the causal link appears to be positive. Closed
economies, which rely on small domestic markets and import
substitution, tend to foster low-employment, capital-intensive
growth patterns. They suffer from recurrent balance-of-payments
crises and appear biased against agriculture, in which most poor
people work. Further, protectionism may nurture monopolies,
shelter rent-seeking and corruption, and weaken the rule of law.  
But why are the links between globalization and poverty in the
short term, especially since the mid 1970s, less clear, at least at
the broad regional levels?  Possible explanations are the fol-
lowing:
• Changes in product and factor prices triggered by opening
up an economy inevitably produce both winners and losers
in the short term. The timing, scale, and sequencing of pol-
icy reforms, as well as pre-existing domestic conditions,
have a bearing on where and how these gains and losses
occur. Further, the relationship between globalization,
growth, income distribution, and poverty is likely to
evolve as an economy changes in structure. Hence, short-
term data, aggregated at the regional level, are likely to be
muddled by the wide diversity in country-specific situa-
tions and experiences.
• A country’s performance in terms of growth and poverty
alleviation is tied to the overall functioning of the interna-
tional economy at a given time. For example, during the
1960s and 1970s, high growth, negative real interest rates,
and high inflation reduced poverty in the relatively
resource-abundant, primary exporters of Africa and Latin
America, which also received much of the international
capital flows. But then, the collapse in world commodity
prices after the 1980s, mostly due to changed economic
policies in industrialized countries, negatively affected
their growth rates and poverty levels.
• Structural shifts in international markets matter. The recent
entry of China in world markets with its vast reservoir of
low-skilled workers has changed the configuration of com-
parative advantage among developing nations.  Further,
high-skill-biased technological change, in part spurred by
globalization itself, has affected developing countries’
economic performance and income distribution. Finally,
world economic volatility may have increased, mostly
linked to gyrations in world capital markets. If the proba-
bility of crises increases with openness, the poor may face
additional risks. 
Ultimately, globalization’s effects on poverty depend on
the extent to which the poor are able to participate in the
expanding sectors. Where the poor live in rural or other areas
that lack infrastructure and are detached from the global econ-
omy, uneven progress across sectors or geographical regions
may result (as China’s policy-induced segregation between
urban-rural and coast-hinterland suggests). Further, a vast
majority of the poor will simply be unable to take advantage of
globalization while trade barriers remain on products in which
the poor have comparative advantage.
CONCLUSION
The last wave of globalization has raised incomes and stan-
dards of living in the developing world to levels not seen
before.  However, the advances have been uneven and some
developing countries, in regions like Sub-Saharan Africa, are
experiencing painful declines in human welfare.  Also, inequal-
ity appears to be increasing, giving rise to domestic and inter-
national tensions. 
Increasing the pace of poverty alleviation requires that
policies that further integrate developing countries into the
global economy be complemented by domestic pro-poor poli-
cies and institutional development that cushion adjustment
shocks and enable the poor to take advantage of the new oppor-
tunities offered by globalization. Developed countries must do
their part by rectifying policies such as agricultural and textile
protectionism. Strengthening international institutions to
ensure transparency and fair play and to reduce potential eco-
nomic instability remains crucial, not only to speed up poverty
alleviation, but to induce developing countries to embrace
global partnership in the first place. 
For further reading see N. Crafts, Globalization and Growth in the
Twentieth Century, IMF Working Paper WP/00/44 (International
Monetary Fund, 2000); R. Kohl and K. O’Rourke, “What’s New
About Globalisation: Implications for Income Inequality in
Developing Countries,” paper for Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development Conference on “Poverty and Income
Inequality in Developing Countries,” Paris, 2000.
Manohar Sharma (m.sharma@cgiar.org) is a research fellow in IFPRI’s Food Consumption and Nutrition Division; Sam Morley
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TRADE ANDFOODSECURITY
SHAPING GLOBALIZATION FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATION
AND FOOD SECURITY
T
rade expansion, fueled in part by trade liberalization, is
seen by many as a central, if not the main, component of
globalization. While this collection takes a broader view of
globalization (see Brief 1), the controversial links between
trade liberalization and food security, an important dimension
of the globalization debate, are discussed here. 
Food security has improved over the past four decades.
Total food availability in developing countries, measured in
daily calories and grams of proteins per capita, was 27 per-
cent higher at the end of the 1990s than in the 1960s, even
though the world population almost doubled during that
time. The number of malnourished children under five (a bet-
ter indicator of food problems than average food availability)
declined between the 1970s and the mid-1990s by about 37
million, and the incidence of malnutrition dropped from 47
percent to 31 percent. 
Other points to be noted are:
• Food availability in developing countries comes mostly
from domestic production: imports were about 15 percent
of total food production in the 1990s (up from 10 percent
in the 1960s and 1970s). 
• Food trade, along with stocks, helped reduce the variability
of food consumption in developing countries to 1/3 to 1/5
of that of food production.
• The burden of the total food bill (measured by food imports
as a percentage of total exports) declined on average for all
developing countries from almost 20 percent in the 1960s
to about 6 percent currently. This decrease resulted from the
expansion of total trade, which has grown faster than food
imports, and a decline in real food prices. 
• Volatility of agricultural prices in world markets in the last
half of the 1990s—since the implementation of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) agricultural agreements—does
not seem to be higher than for the whole period since the
1960s. It is less clear what has happened to the volatility of
agricultural prices within developing countries, because
domestic policies come into play.
Although food security has improved in general over the
last few decades, there are regions and countries at risk, and
some have become more food insecure:
• Average food availability is still low for regions such as
Sub-Saharan Africa. And for more than one-fourth of all
developing countries, per capita indicators have decreased
since the 1960s. In most cases those declines appear to be
associated with war.
• The number of malnourished children under the age of five
has actually increased in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the
incidence of malnutrition is still very high there and in
South Asia.
• For the 49 least-developed countries, the total food bill has
remained high at 20 percent, and several developing coun-
tries with large external debts face additional constraints in
financing their food imports. 
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND WTO 
NEGOTIATIONS
Industrialized countries. The combination of domestic sup-
port, market protection, and export subsidies in industrial-
ized countries has displaced agricultural production and
exports from developing countries. This is an especially
important issue for the poorer countries, where two-thirds of
the population live in rural areas, agriculture generates over
one-third of the gross domestic product, and a substantial
percentage of exports depend on agriculture. A key concern
for developing countries, therefore, is the elimination of
subsidies and protectionism in industrialized countries.
Against this general proposition, three concerns have been
raised.
• First, will the food bill of net importing countries be
increased by the liberalization of agricultural policies in
industrialized countries?
• Second, for those developing countries that have preferen-
tial access to the protected markets of rich countries, will
the liberalization of trade in those markets lead to the ero-
sion of trade preferences?
• Finally, will export expansion have harmful effects on
poverty and food security?
In the first two cases, a welfare-enhancing approach would
be to proceed with the liberalization of markets in rich coun-
tries, along with cash grants or other financial schemes to com-
pensate poor countries for higher prices and lost preferences.
The third question is linked to earlier criticisms of the
Green Revolution, later extended to commercialization and
international trade: first, it is argued, the limited resources of
small farmers could prevent them from participating in expand-
ing markets and lead to worsening income distribution. Second,
and more worrisome, if relative prices shift against the poor or
if the power of already dominant actors (large landowners, big
commercial enterprises) is reinforced to allow them to extract
income from the poor or to appropriate their assets, the poor
could become worse off in absolute terms. It has also been
argued that food security could decrease if cash or export pro-“A 2020 VISION FOR FOOD, AGRICULTURE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT” IS AN INITIATIVE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FOOD
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duction displaces staple crops, and if these changes result in
women having less decisionmaking power and fewer
resources.
Yet, several studies have shown that the Green
Revolution—and domestic and international commercializa-
tion—can yield benefits for the poor because of its effect on pro-
duction, employment, and food prices, although any uniform
attainment of benefits is by no means guaranteed. Trade expan-
sion that creates income opportunities for women may also give
them greater control over expenditures, with positive impact on
child nutrition and development, as well as greater incentives to
invest in girls. But there may be a trade-off between income-gen-
erating activities and the time allocated for childcare—an issue
currently being analyzed at IFPRI. Generally, complementary
policies are needed to increase the physical and human capital
owned by the poor and by women, to build general infrastruc-
tures and services, to ensure that markets operate competitively,
and to eliminate institutional, political, and social biases that dis-
criminate against vulnerable groups.
Developing countries. During the current WTO agricul-
tural negotiations (which began in March 2000), several devel-
oping countries indicated concerns that further trade liberaliza-
tion could create problems for their large agricultural popula-
tions, among which poverty is concentrated. Poor countries
have argued for a slower pace in reducing their tariffs (or main-
taining current levels) on the premise that industrialized coun-
tries should first eliminate their higher levels of protection and
subsidization. Another concern is how to avoid any sudden
negative impact on poor producers, whose vulnerable liveli-
hoods may be irreparably damaged by drastic shocks (for
instance, by forcing poor families to sell productive assets or to
take children from school).
This policy debate reflects a permanent tension between
maintaining high prices for producers versus assuring low
prices for consumers. While industrialized countries have used
transfers from consumers and taxpayers to maintain high prices
for producers, developing countries have enforced low agricul-
tural prices to further the process of industrialization. Several
studies have shown that poverty alleviation in developing
countries was impaired by policies that protected capital-inten-
sive industrialization and discriminated against agriculture.
Post-1980s policy reforms in developing countries appear to
have reduced general policy biases against agriculture, but in
some cases, they may have contributed to the decline of the
infrastructure and institutions needed for agricultural produc-
tion and commercialization. Although further improvements in
the general policy framework may still be needed in some
countries, now the emphasis should be on investments in the
rural economy, focusing on the poor.
Out of concern for small farmers, some have argued that
developing countries should move even further towards protec-
tion of the agricultural sector. However, considering that poor
households may spend as much as 50 percent of their income
on food, these recommendations could have a negative impact
on the poverty and food security of poor urban households,
landless rural workers, and even poor small farmers, who tend
to be net buyers of food. Trade protection for food products is
equivalent to a regressive implicit tax on food consumption,
mostly captured by large agricultural producers, with a greater
impact on poor consumers. Also, trade protection for any sec-
tor usually implies negative employment and production
effects in other sectors, and widespread trade protection leads
to a reduction in exports.
The best approach for developing countries is to eliminate
biases against the agricultural sector in the general policy
framework, and to increase investments in human capital, prop-
erty rights, management of land and water, technology, infra-
structure, nonagricultural rural enterprises, organizations of
small farmers, and other forms of expansion of social capital
and political participation for the poor and vulnerable. At the
same time, developing countries may legitimately insist that
industrialized countries reduce first their higher levels of subsi-
dization and protection, and ask for policy instruments to pro-
tect the livelihoods of the rural poor from import shocks that
could cause irreparable damage.
These issues are currently being discussed in WTO agri-
cultural negotiations. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture
(AoA) does not constrain good policies that genuinely address
issues of poverty and food security (such as stocks for food
security and domestic food aid for populations in need). Under
the AoA, countries must make serious efforts to structure well-
defined programs for poverty (Article 6.2). Poor producers can
also be helped by the disciplines on subsidized exports. Yet,
some clarification of the language of the AoA may be required,
along with a better definition of country groupings based on
objective indicators of food insecurity. 
CONCLUSION
Overall, changes in food security have been positive but
uneven, and populations in some developing countries and
regions remain seriously at risk. To increase food security
requires both reductions of agricultural subsidies in devel-
oped countries and funding to support rural development,
food security, and rural poverty-alleviation programs in
developing countries. Rather than legal constraints to their
own policies under the WTO, the main problem facing
developing countries in ensuring food security is the lack of
financial, human, and institutional resources. This could be
addressed by linking agricultural trade negotiations to
increased funding by international and bilateral organiza-
tions for rural development and poverty alleviation. 
For further reading see E. Díaz-Bonilla, M. Thomas, A. Cattaneo,
and S. Robinson, Food Security and Trade Negotiations in the
World Trade Organization: A Cluster Analysis of Country Groups,
Trade and Macroeconomics Discussion Paper 59 (IFPRI, 2000);
and L. Smith and L. Haddad, Explaining Child Malnutrition in
Developing Countries: A Cross-Country Analysis, IFPRI Research
Report 111 (IFPRI, 2000).
Eugenio Díaz-Bonilla (e.diaz-bonilla@cgiar.org) is a research fellow and Marcelle Thomas (m.thomas@cgiar.org) is a research analyst in the Trade
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O
f the world’s 6 billion people, about 800 million do not
have enough to eat. Globally, nutrition has improved in
recent decades, but malnutrition—including deficiencies in
micronutrients—is still widespread. Hunger, combined with
low intake of important micronutrients such as vitamin A, zinc,
iron, and iodine, contributes to low birth weight, infections, and
increased risk of death. In developing countries, close to 24
percent of all newborns have impaired growth due to poor
nutrition during fetal development. About 33 percent of all
children under the age of five are stunted. Because of iron defi-
ciencies, about 2 billion people worldwide suffer from anemia,
and 9 out of 10 of them live in developing countries.
Improving nutrition will continue to be a challenge, and
the current move toward accelerated globalization can play
either a positive or a negative role in reducing malnutrition and
hunger. Policies that reduce the negative and enhance the posi-
tive effects of globalization on nutrition and groups most at risk
will be needed, at both the international and national levels.
THE POSITIVE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON
NUTRITION
Global expansion of agricultural trade and finance can prevent
fluctuations in food supply, thereby enabling developing coun-
tries to import food at adequate and stable prices. Three-fourths
of the world’s poor live in rural areas and depend—directly and
indirectly—on agriculture. In about 25 percent of developing
countries more than two-thirds of total exports are agricultural
commodities. Improved market access for these countries can
increase agricultural exports, thereby increasing foreign
exchange earnings and imports of food (and capital goods).
Raising the level of income and employment among low-
income rural families also increases the amount of food poor
people can afford and protects them from higher food prices in
the event of shortages in domestic markets.
The globalization of advances in technology and transport
can improve traditional methods of agricultural production and
marketing, contributing to the achievement of food security
and providing access to better nutrition in the long run. Poor
populations often lack access to markets, information, and
communication technologies, putting them at a competitive
disadvantage in world markets. However, recently developed
technologies could be adapted to the constraints faced by
developing countries and the poor. For example, wireless
phones require a lower capital investment to set up and are par-
ticularly suited to remote locations. 
Improved access to information and data via the Internet
can allow researchers and policymakers to learn about new
nutrition initiatives, share information, obtain best practices,
and map food production and undernutrition by country and by
regions within countries. Information networks can provide a
forum for debate on nutrition-related issues, increasing global
awareness.
The integration of labor markets gives the poor and mal-
nourished a greater variety of employment possibilities and
opportunities to acquire and diversify their income. The growth
in relatively labor-intensive, long-distance services—data pro-
cessing, software programming, clerical and professional serv-
ices—could increase the commercial service exports of devel-
oping countries. These opportunities indirectly offer potential
improvements in nutrition, but there is also the risk that mal-
nourished and unhealthy individuals may not be able to capture
these jobs.
NUTRITIONAL RISKS AND EMERGING (DIETARY)
CHALLENGES
Despite its potential for improving nutrition, several aspects of
the globalization process may worsen human nutrition in devel-
oping countries. Increasing trade could create a major shift in
the structure of diets, resulting in a growing epidemic of the so-
called “diseases of affluence.” Traditional, low-cost diets, rich
in fiber and grain, are likely to be replaced by high-cost diets
that include greater proportions of sugars, oils, and animal fats,
giving rise to higher food costs and an increase in weight gain,
obesity, and associated chronic diseases that affect children and
adults alike. Aggressive promotion of such goods by producers
and distributors can further accelerate adverse changes in diet.
In China, for example, the number of overweight adults jumped
by more than half—from 9 to 15 percent—between 1989 and
1992. These problems are no longer limited to the well-off. A
recent IFPRI study found that a large share of poor Asian
households have at least one obese member.
In addition to potentially harmful dietary changes, huge
cross-border capital flows leave developing countries particu-
larly vulnerable to international economic fluctuations. For
example, recent evidence from Indonesia, whose economy was
badly hit during the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 and
1998, shows an increase in poverty and nutritional deficiencies
for that period.
The impact of globalization on nutrition also depends on
the domestic policies of industrialized countries. While efforts
have been made over the years to improve market access,
developed countries are still reluctant to open up their domes-
tic markets. Distorting policies and high tariffs, sometimes 100
percent or higher, set for meat, dairy, and other products in the
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U.S., Europe, and Japan, restrict trade in products of particular
importance to poor farmers in developing countries—a situa-
tion that denies them the benefits of trade liberalization and
increasing globalization.
As globalization proceeds, food safety standards are
becoming more uniform across countries. For groups already at
risk nutritionally, elevating these standards could mean a trade-
off between food safety and food security. The safety concerns
of developed countries may further restrict market access for
food products from developing countries. Farmers in develop-
ing countries may not be able to meet the standards because
they lack the adequate institutions and infrastructure. In addi-
tion, imposing these standards on developing countries could
result in higher food prices for poor consumers.
SHAPING GLOBALIZATION TO IMPROVE
NUTRITION
An urgent task for the international community is to help devel-
oping countries become better integrated into the world econo-
my. This can be done by helping them build up needed sup-
porting institutions and policies, by helping them adjust to and
comply with international agreements and terms of trade, and
by enhancing their access to world markets,.
Reducing the high, trade-distorting barriers that are in
place in most industrialized countries would facilitate develop-
ing countries’ market access and create a favorable environ-
ment for agricultural development in these countries. Progress
has been made in reducing tariff barriers on unprocessed tropi-
cal products like coffee, tea, and cocoa. Many more developing
countries would benefit if similar improvements in market
access were granted for other agricultural products, such as
temperate-zone horticultural products, sugar, cereals, and meat,
as well as for processed agricultural products. Multilateral lib-
eralization would also substantially increase world prices for
these commodities, thus benefiting producers.
The nutrition and health communities must respond to
problems of unhealthy diets and overnutrition. While the stig-
ma against obesity is absent in most developing countries, peo-
ple affected by these trends will be hurt in the long run if meas-
ures to address them are not taken. Through cost-effective
nutrition interventions, education programs, and dissemination
strategies, an infrastructure must be set up to help foster a bal-
anced and low-cost diet that will limit the risks of obesity and
coronary disease. New policies should encourage the produc-
tion and marketing of vegetables, fruits, legumes, and a variety
of other foods of plant origin, along with decreasing support for
the production of fat, sugar, and fatty, sugary foods and drinks.
Modern science and new technologies in information, biol-
ogy, and communications can provide the poor and malnour-
ished with a voice in policymaking and the tools to become
more effective at facing the competitive forces and risks
brought about by globalization. For such opportunities to mate-
rialize, innovations must be specifically targeted to solving the
nutritional and agricultural problems of these groups. For
example, while science based on molecular biology is moving
at great speed, its application to small-scale agriculture in
developing countries has thus far been limited to cotton in
China. If focused on reducing hunger and malnutrition,
biotechnology could help combat widespread nutritional prob-
lems such as iron and vitamin A deficiencies.
Improvements in health care and access to drugs must also
be facilitated. The World Health Organization estimates that
only eight percent of the $50 to $60 billion in health research
worldwide goes to diseases that afflict people in developing
counties. Given the synergy between nutrition and health, tar-
geted research and health interventions can contribute signifi-
cantly to the promotion of nutritional well-being. A health
infrastructure capable of delivering comprehensive care and
adequate follow-up can help identify and rehabilitate people
who are malnourished. At the same time, the access of poor
people to essential medications at affordable prices must be
protected.
In countries exposed to globalization, the role of the pub-
lic sector in many areas of food security and nutrition appears
to be shrinking, while the involvement of civil society and the
private sector is increasing. Such a shift may be appropriate,
but globalization should not substitute for appropriate national
policies. Recent research and experience shows how important
an effective public sector is in areas related to nutrition and
food security. Access to land, primary education, primary
health care, and other pro-poor policies become even more
important as the at-risk groups are exposed to the competitive
forces, risks, and opportunities brought by globalization.
Governments should assess how globalization will affect at-
risk populations, determine whether they can limit the negative
impact, and design and implement compensatory schemes and
safety nets where needed.
Good governance is needed to guide the transformation of
the agricultural sector in a direction beneficial to the poor.
Inadequate domestic policies and lack of access to resources
and markets are presently making it difficult for the poor to
gain from globalization. Governments should ensure that mar-
kets remain competitive. They need to implement the appropri-
ate policies and make the necessary changes that will reduce
marketing costs and price distortions and allow the agricultur-
al sector to benefit from new technological opportunities. 
For further reading, see ACC/SCN (Administrative Committee on
Coordination/Subcommittee on Nutrition of the United Nations),
Fourth Report on the World Nutrition Situation (Geneva: ACC/SCN
in collaboration with IFPRI, 2000); A. Drewnowski and B. M.
Popkin, “Dietary Fats and the Nutrition Transition: New Trends in
the Global Diet,” Nutrition Reviews 55 (No.2, 1997): 31–43; and Z.
Qureshi, “Globalization: New Opportunities, Tough Challenges”
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1996/03/pdf/qureshi.pdf
(a 1995 paper based on a World Bank report, Global Economic
Prospects and the Developing Countries 1995).
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SHAPING GLOBALIZATION FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATION
AND FOOD SECURITY
O
ver the past quarter century, the production and con-
sumption of high-value food products (HVFPs) in devel-
oping countries have soared. At the same time, wholesale and
retail marketing of these items has changed rapidly. In both
industrialized and developing countries, the HVFP sector is
becoming global in scope and growing increasingly concen-
trated at the levels of production and marketing.
This dynamic situation poses special obstacles for small-
scale farmers, who constitute the majority of the population
in many poor developing countries. They will have difficul-
ty improving their livelihoods if they are not involved in this
rapidly evolving sector. The key challenge is to find non-dis-
torting, equitable policy and technology options that support
the participation of small-scale producers in HVFP markets.
At the same time, the creation or preservation of artificial
advantages for large enterprises that drive small-scale pro-
ducers out of those markets must be avoided. Trade barriers
such as agricultural tariffs, implemented in the name of pro-
tecting smallholder agriculture, often, in fact, serve the inter-
ests of large domestic operations that compete with small
farmers.
THE RAPID RISE IN PRODUCTION AND TRADE OF
HVFPS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The growth in HVFP production has been particularly rapid
in the area of animal products such as poultry, pork, and fish
(where production has grown between 5 percent and 8 per-
cent per year). Consumption of HVFPs has also grown rap-
idly in developing countries. From the early 1980s to the
mid-1990s, the average yearly increase in consumption was
5.4 percent for meat and 3.1 percent for milk; both are pro-
jected to grow at 2.9 percent per year between the late 1990s
and 2020. Consumption of vegetables and fruits is also
expanding quickly in developing countries for the same rea-
sons: population growth, urbanization, and an increase in
income (with the latter two factors contributing to changes
in diet away from starchy staples toward HVFPs).
In addition to the domestic demand in developing coun-
tries, net exports of HVFPs to developed countries have also
increased. In the case of fish and poultry, expansion for trade
has rapidly outpaced the high growth rate of production for
domestic markets. Also, reversing a previous pattern, fish
has become a major net export to industrialized countries in
recent years. The aggregate value of net fisheries exports
from developing to developed countries now often exceeds
the combined value of net exports of coffee, tea, cocoa,
bananas, and sugar.
THE RAPID CONCENTRATION OF GLOBAL
MARKETING CHAINS FOR HVFPS
Global markets for high-value agricultural produce have
become increasingly concentrated in recent years, with greater
vertical integration between producers and consumers. This
consolidation has occurred in response to forces associated
with globalization, such as shifts in demographics and con-
sumer demand, improved communication, and increased inter-
national capital flow.
With mergers of multinational companies reducing the
number of actors in global markets, the coordination of pro-
curement, processing, and distribution of products within the
same multinational firms has increased. This has changed the
environment within which exporters from developing countries
operate. Both traditional multinational processing firms and the
increasingly active multinational supermarket chains procure
produce directly from developing countries. Unlike an earlier
era when national corporations traded raw commodities across
national borders, multinational companies increasingly pro-
cure, process, package, and distribute food commodities across
many borders, with more direct activity in the developing coun-
tries themselves.
Similar trends of concentration and vertical integration can
be observed among larger companies in developing countries.
Charoen Pokphand is a Thai company founded in 1921 that
specialized in domestic seed supply through the 1960s. It is
now the major force in feed milling, chicken and shrimp pro-
duction and export, and restaurants in Southeast Asia. In 1995,
Charoen Pokphand had $4 billion in sales, controlled 80 per-
cent of shrimp feed in India, owned 75 feed mills in China,
owned over 800 food outlets in Thailand, and was a major
global producer of shrimp and chicken.
Export transactions involving HVFPs from developing
countries increasingly take place under forward contracts and
are subject to stringent specifications regarding food safety,
quality, quantity, and timeliness of delivery. In the late
1960s, [RTF annotation:  Not all readers will connect
“Northern” to industrialized countries.  If we want to avoid
using “countries” twice, better “food processors from the
North began…”]food processors from industrialized coun-
tries began to invest directly in collection and processing
plants in developing countries (for example, Birdseye’s
export of frozen vegetables from Mexico). More recently,
supermarket chains from industrialized countries have begun
to contract directly with suppliers in developing countries,
sometimes in competition with independent processors, but
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Effective participation by developing-country producers in
these growing global markets requires access to specialized
information, technology, professional knowledge, assets, institu-
tions, infrastructure, and liquidity. Furthermore, the same pres-
sures that operate in international markets also affect the grow-
ing high-value end of domestic markets. Predictability of safety,
quality, and ontime deliveries of known quantities is critical.
Small-scale and traditional producers have trouble partici-
pating under these conditions. For such producers to remain
engaged in growing HVFP markets, they must be able to con-
tract forward with the main outlets for their produce, and must
be organized in ways that reduce the risks that either party will
be unable to complete the terms of their contract.
KEEPING SMALL-SCALE FARMERS INVOLVED IN
GROWING HFVP MARKETS
Two key strategies for keeping smallholder farmers involved in
demanding markets for HVFPs are producer marketing cooper-
atives and contract farming schemes. The histories of both are
mixed and have been extensively documented. The central
issues are (1) whether wholesale and retail outlets have options
for securing products other than by dealing with smallholder
farmers (such options would include investments in planta-
tions), (2) whether governments are playing a role in providing
a facilitating environment for smallholder production, and (3)
to what degree smallholder farmers are participating in the
management of smallholder schemes.
Horticulture in the central highlands of Kenya provides a
good example of a capital- and skill-intensive activity that has
steadily shifted to smaller-scale contract farms. Strong political
backing by the government has been central to its success,
including a favorable regulatory environment and good infra-
structure, such as extension to growers along with market infor-
mation, quality inspection services, and cold storage at the air-
port. In Guatemala and Honduras, where population densities
in the vegetable-growing areas are higher and the political pres-
sure of small farmers is keenly felt, foreign distributors have
tended to contract with large numbers of small farmers. In
Mexico, on the other hand, contracting by US-owned proces-
sors and distributors has tended to involve large Mexican farms
and industrial operations.
Small-scale participation in the livestock and fisheries sec-
tors tends to be more difficult for structural reasons.
Smallholder technologies for controlling pollution and animal
disease become overburdened (and often are not used) when
population densities are high. Compliance is hard to monitor,
and even harder to enforce. Large-scale poultry, hog, and
shrimp operations can often manage to adopt available tech-
nologies to control pollution: where high-value export markets
are at stake, large operations make the necessary investments.
Furthermore, disease-free certification (or expedited border
clearance in terminal markets) is required for export. The
investments necessary for pollution abatement and disease con-
trol are often beyond the means of small-scale farmers operat-
ing independently. Without proactive development and policies
to keep smallholders involved, the industry in developing
countries splits: industrial livestock and fish sectors occupy
expanding export markets, and a static smallholder sector com-
petes for the low end of the domestic market. Worse, since
export certification cannot be easily obtained in areas where
small-scale sectors do not follow controls, the interests of
large- and small-scale producers begin to diverge.
An interesting example of a successful contract farming
initiative is the Soro-Soro Ibaba cooperative in Southern
Luzon, Philippines. The Soro-Soro scheme associates a large
number of nonagricultural investors with regionally defined
groups of small-scale farmers. The cooperative mills its feed
and provides fattener hogs, vaccines, regular veterinary sup-
port, and marketing services. Farmers provide space, buildings,
a waste lagoon, water, labor, and management of the fattening
phase. The fatteners are sold by the cooperative and the farmer
is paid a fixed fee per animal. Provided that the farmer follows
the rules, the risk of animal loss is borne by the investor. The
cooperative provides overall services for management and
supervision, and functions as an investment company, paying
dividends to shareholders.
CONCLUSION
There are successful models for keeping small-scale operators
involved in HVFP. Crucial to this strategy are (1) market
reform policies that encourage smallholder investment and
avoid differential subsidies to large-scale operations, (2) insti-
tutional development to help small-scale operators meet global
standards regarding quality, food safety, and timeliness, and (3)
provision of public goods such as research, extension, and
infrastructure. Such an approach requires both political com-
mitment from government and ways to share the risks and
rewards of vertical coordination fairly, so that small-scale pro-
ducers can participate in growing high-return sectors. 
For further reading see C.L. Delgado, “Sources of Growth in
Smallholder Agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of
Vertical Integration of Smallholders with Processors and
Marketers of High-value Added Items,” Agrekon 38 (1999): 165-
189; C. Eaton and A.W. Shepherd, Contract Farming:
Partnerships for Growth, FAO Agricultural Services Bulletin 145
(Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
2001); S. Jaffee and J. Morton, eds., Marketing Africa’s High-value
Foods: Comparative Experiences of an Emergent Private Sector
(Dubuque, Iowa, USA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1995); and N.W.
Minot, Contract Farming and its Effect on Small Farmers in Less
Developed Countries, Working Paper 31 (East Lansing, Michigan,
USA: Michigan State University, 1986).
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sary to capture all of the potential returns to improved quali-
ty and safety. This may include establishing a legal and reg-
ulatory framework recognized by the importing countries,
along with monitoring and evaluating risks in order to
demonstrate equivalence of risk outcomes to importers.
Public investments—such as sanitation and water supplies
that support better hygiene throughout the food chain and a
marketing infrastructure that improves the performance of
the system in terms of timeliness, freshness, cleanliness, and
quality—can also improve food safety and quality in both
domestic and export markets.
Two examples of nontraditional exports from LDCs illus-
trate how a combination of public and private efforts can over-
come trade barriers based on concerns about safety and quali-
ty. Raspberry exports from Guatemala were implicated in an
outbreak of food-borne illness in the US in 1996, and imports
were suspended. A coalition of industry and government organ-
izations worked with growers to establish and certify good
agricultural practices that reduce the risk of food-borne
pathogens. The export market was re-established in 1999. A
second example is the seafood export industry in Bangladesh,
which faced a ban on exports to the European Union in 1997
because of poor hygiene in processing plants. Both industry
and government made investments in more modern plants and
laboratories, and trained personnel in hazard prevention and
control. As a result, the EU lifted the ban in late 1997.
RESOLVING DIFFERENCES IN STANDARDS
The Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement of the World
Trade Organization provides a framework for resolving dis-
putes about measures that protect human, animal, and plant
health. There is evidence that this agreement has reduced some
SPS barriers to trade and has facilitated trade for LDCs. For
example, developing countries have used the notification sys-
tem to raise concerns about changes in developed-country stan-
dards. When the EU proposed lowering the maximum residue
level for aflatoxin in many food stuffs in 1998, several coun-
tries protested, including Gambia, India, Brazil, and the
Philippines. These countries argued that the EU’s new standard
would raise exporter costs without improving food safety. The
EU later revised its proposed aflatoxin level for peanuts and
announced that it would reconsider other commodities.
Although the SPS agreement has improved discussion of
these issues, LDCs are concerned that internationally recog-
nized standards established under the Codex Alimentarius do
not adequately represent their conditions and constraints.
Furthermore, controversies over the role of science and con-
sumer protection in setting standards remain to be resolved.
DOMESTIC PUBLIC HEALTH
One important question is whether improvements in the quali-
ty and safety of exports benefit domestic consumers in LDCs.
The relative importance of food-safety risks differs with cli-
mate, food habits, levels of income, and public infrastructure.
In developing countries, poor sanitation and inadequate sup-
plies of safe drinking water pose a much greater hazard to
health than in developed ones. For example, according to the
World Health Organization, diarrheal disease is the greatest
cause of illness and death in children under age five, and con-
taminated food contributes to 70 percent of these deaths.
Mycotoxins are more prevalent in the subtropics and tropics,
and pose greater risks where diets are concentrated in foods
with higher mycotoxin levels. Parasites and intestinal worms
are also more common in LDCs. These differences in the
source and incidence of food-borne illness mean that public
interventions to address health issues in LDCs can be expected
to differ from those that address export barriers.
When a product is consumed domestically and invest-
ments to meet export market standards for that product affect
a large portion of production, those investments will have
positive spillovers for domestic consumers. However, some
products may be produced almost entirely for export, in
which case, investments to meet high standards for quality
and safety in exports will have little or no direct spillovers
for domestic food safety. Indirectly, new export markets can
improve people’s health and well-being by increasing the
income of rural households.
CONCLUSIONS
Globalization brings new opportunities for food producers, along
with new challenges to meet growing demands for quality and
food safety. Capturing new opportunities to export high-value
food products will require LDC exporters to manage safety from
farm to table and to meet increasingly stringent food-safety stan-
dards in import markets. Successful performance in export mar-
kets has the potential for substantial gains from trade, as well as
generating income in the rural sector in LDCs, but at the same
time, it requires new and different kinds of market coordination.
The public sector can play a role in improving food safety and
quality to meet export-market standards, addressing domestic
issues of public health at the same time.
The challenges that arise are not for the LDCs alone—
developed countries have a responsibility to consider the impli-
cations of their standards for food safety and quality and their
requirements for enforcing those standards. They also have a
responsibility to provide technical assistance to their LDC trad-
ing partners. 
For further reading see F.K. Kaferstein, Y. Motarjemi, and D.W.
Bettcher, “Foodborne Disease Control: A Transnational
Challenge,” in Emerging Infectious Diseases (Atlanta: Centers for
Disease Control, 1997), ; L.J. Unnevehr and N. Hirschhorn, Food
Safety Issues in the Developing World (World Bank Technical
Paper No. 469, 2000), ; and Understanding the WTO Agreement on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (Geneva: World Trade
Organization, 1998).
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I
ncreased trade in food products has many benefits. It provides
greater dietary diversity, year-round availability, and, often,
lower prices to consumers in many countries. Growing incomes
around the world are leading to increased consumption and trade
of animal and seafood products. Consumers in many countries
find unfamiliar or nontraditional foods becoming increasingly
available. In addition to these potential benefits to consumers,
producers in less-developed countries (LDCs) benefit from
expanded food exports, which earn foreign exchange and
increase rural incomes.
However, these changes also carry certain risks. New
foods, particularly fresh foods, may carry new or unfamiliar
hazards. There are changes in the way food is handled and
marketed. New pathogens or antibiotic resistance in pathogens
may emerge. And the increased availability of processed or
prepared foods reduces consumer control over preparation. The
benefits to consumers and to low-income producers will not be
realized if food exports from LDCs do not meet food-safety
and quality standards in high-income markets or if LDCs can-
not improve food safety for their own consumers.
A new understanding and awareness of the importance of
food-borne disease has developed, with the result that food
safety and food quality are becoming more important issues for
the world’s consumers, who increasingly demand greater safe-
ty assurances from food producers and regulators.. This
increased awareness coincides with the identification of new
pathogens and their potential long-term consequences, coupled
with better surveillance and trace-back techniques.
During the 1990s, many industrialized countries introduced
new, more stringent food-safety standards, such as mandatory
process controls to reduce risks throughout the production
process. Meeting these standards for higher food safety and qual-
ity poses a challenge to LDCs as they seek to expand agricultur-
al exports. While such exports can provide an important source
of income for the rural poor, meeting higher standards can
require additional management, capital investments, purchased
inputs, monitoring, and certification. Whether small producers
can successfully meet these requirements remains to be seen.
How these standards will be met and whether meeting
them will have benefits for poor consumers and producers in
LDCs are issues explored in this brief.
FARM-TO-TABLE MANAGEMENT
There is growing recognition that both quality and safety must
often be managed from farm to table through process controls,
such as the use of good agricultural practices or good manu-
facturing practices in food production and processing. Because
many hazards may enter food products at several points in the
production process—and are expensive to test for—prevention
and control through documented production practices is often
the only way to verify food safety. The public sector has also
embraced the concept of process control and hazard preven-
tion, which is now mandated in several industrialized countries
for portions of the food system.
This movement toward farm-to-table process control has impor-
tant implications for LDC exporters of fresh food products:
• First, there are market incentives for LDC exporters to
adapt these management practices and to coordinate safe-
ty and quality management more closely with importers.
• Second, such costs may influence the distribution of bene-
fits from trade. Studies in the United States and Europe
have demonstrated that there are economies of scale in
food-safety management. It is possible that safety stan-
dards favor large-scale producers in export industries.
• Third, LDC exporters must demonstrate that foods pro-
duced with different production practices are just as safe
as those produced within importing countries.  To do so,
the public sector in LDCs will need to demonstrate equiv-
alent regulatory capacity in order to meet importers’ food-
safety standards.
Increasingly specialized product specifications and the
demands of niche markets require specialized quality manage-
ment. Sometimes characterized as total quality management,
such approaches provide assurances that products will meet
these complex specifications. Internationally recognized certi-
fication, often through the International Standards
Organization (ISO), is increasingly applied to food production
and processing. The ISO provides a “standard for standards” by
applying a framework to verify the quality-assurance elements
of a firm’s production process. This type of quality and safety
management is increasingly in demand in high-income mar-
kets, and new institutions are evolving to certify production
practices for meats and horticultural products.
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ACTIONS TO MEET FOOD-
SAFETY STANDARDS
To meet differing food-safety standards, the private sector must
coordinate the process from the import market back to export
production. For example, production in an LDC could be
owned and controlled by a multinational firm for export to a
high-income market, or local growers might be coordinated
through an exporting firm that provides guidance on quality
standards and assurances to importers.
However, private coordination alone may not be enough
to meet export standards; public involvement may be neces-
LAURIAN J. UNNEVEHR
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TECHNOLOGICALCHANGE
SHAPING GLOBALIZATION FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATION
AND FOOD SECURITY
M
odern agricultural technologies have transformed the
global food situation from one of widespread shortages
and famine in the 1960s to one in which food would be plentiful
if it were more equitably shared. Yet despite this achievement,
some 1.2 billion people remain in abject poverty and do not get
enough to eat. Many more live on nutritionally inadequate diets. 
About 90 percent of the developing world’s poor live in
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Some three-quarters of those live
in rural areas where they depend on agriculture for their daily
existence. Agricultural growth is therefore crucial to raise them
out of poverty. The globalization of agricultural markets
brought about by trade liberalization and worldwide changes in
markets and marketing channels poses special challenges for
small-scale farmers and resource-poor areas in all developing
countries. This brief focuses on Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Each of these regions faces a unique set of challenges and
opportunities as it seeks to compete in global markets. Given
their structural conditions, each of these regions needs its own
approach to investments in technology and infrastructure in
order to enable it to participate fully in global agricultural mar-
kets while benefiting the rural poor. 
ASIA
Asia’s remarkable transition from daunting food deficits in the
1960s to national food surpluses today has been accompanied by
an equally dramatic reduction in poverty. Half of all Asians lived
in poverty in 1970, compared to one-quarter today. But Asia’s
current food situation is nonetheless paradoxical. On the one
hand, many increasingly affluent Asians are diversifying and
enriching their diets. This has led to a veritable explosion in
demand for livestock products, fruits, vegetables, and vegetable
oils, which in turn has led to rapid growth in demand for feed
grains. On the other hand, despite the increasing affluence of
many, some 800 million Asians still live in poverty and 20 mil-
lion preschool children remain malnourished. They do not have
the means to buy the food they need, in spite of its ready avail-
ability. They desperately need better livelihood opportunities.
The changing food consumption patterns of the more afflu-
ent offer Asia favorable opportunities for agricultural growth
through diversification of production. Markets for horticultural
and livestock products and feed grains are growing. While glob-
alization and trade liberalization will enable more farmers to par-
ticipate in supplying international markets, they will also
increase competitive pressures in domestic markets. Farmers will
prosper most in those regions that are best equipped to compete
in the market. That is, where investments have been made in
rural infrastructure and technology (roads, transport, electricity,
improved crop varieties, disease control) and where improve-
ments have been made in marketing and distribution systems for
higher value, perishable foods (refrigeration, communications,
food processing and storage, food safety regulations). 
Agricultural growth of this type can contribute to incomes
and reduce poverty in rural Asia. But if left to market forces
alone, many poorer regions and poor people are likely to be left
behind. They will become victims of globalization, not benefi-
ciaries, and be faced with worsening poverty and environmen-
tal degradation. To avoid this, two types of public interventions
are needed. 
• First are interventions to help small-scale farmers capture
part of the currently expanding markets, even within
regions that have good infrastructure. Agricultural
research must give adequate attention to the problems of
smallholder farming, and small-scale farmers must be bet-
ter organized for efficient marketing and input supply.
• Second are interventions to spread the benefits of new
markets to the less-favored areas where many of the rural
poor live. Investments in the long-term economic growth
of these regions are needed. Policymakers have been reluc-
tant to do this in the past, preferring to rely on “trickle
down” benefits from investments in high-potential areas
(such as increased employment, migration opportunities,
and cheaper food). Yet this has proven insufficient.
Population densities and the number of people living in
poverty in many less-favored areas are set to increase in
the future. Without adequate investments in basic infra-
structure, technology, and human development, less-
favored areas will become even poorer and more degrad-
ed. But the right policies and investments could enable
these areas to do quite well. Livestock and agroforestry,
unlike crops, can often thrive in zones with poor soils and
climate, but farmers there must have access to markets.
Economic growth in Asia is also creating new opportuni-
ties for nonfarm activities in less-favored areas. 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Sub-Saharan Africa now faces a situation similar to that which
faced Asia in the early 1960s, with widespread poverty and
malnutrition, large national food deficits, and high and increas-
ing dependence on food imports and concessionary aid. Also,
like pre-Green Revolution Asia, African crop yields are
extremely low and there is tremendous potential for increasing
yields with the right technologies.
Rural Africa, however, has a much lower density of infra-
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much of South Asia had in the 1950s. Market access and trans-
port costs, too, are obstacles to Africa’s development. Input-
intensive technologies are not economic when farmers must
pay three to five times the world market price for their fertiliz-
er and receive only 30 to 60 percent of the market value for
their products. Nor are they economic when extra production
simply cannot be transported and sold.  Many Green
Revolution projects have failed in Africa because they were not
profitable for farmers after project subsidies and transport sup-
port systems were withdrawn.  
Some irrigated and high-potential rainfed areas in Africa do
have good access to markets and inputs. In these tracts, input-
intensive technologies can be profitable and make important
contributions to agricultural growth and national food security.
These areas, which often lie along key road and rail transport
corridors, will benefit from new market opportunities presented
by trade liberalization. But for most African farmers, globaliza-
tion of agricultural markets will make no significant difference to
their livelihood opportunities until considerable improvements
are made in infrastructure and marketing institutions.   
Modern, input-intensive farming is unlikely to be econom-
ic in much of rainfed Africa for at least another two to three
decades, until rural infrastructure, markets, and agricultural
input supply systems have caught up. In the meantime, most of
rural Africa, particularly small-scale farmers in rainfed areas,
will need to look to lower cost alternatives such as low exter-
nal input (LEI) farming technologies. Examples of these are
mixed farming systems with integrated crops, livestock, and
farm trees; intercropping, green manures, and crop rotations;
improved fallows and cover crops; and judicious use of sup-
plementary inputs like phosphate and lime.
While farmers have been using these methods for genera-
tions, there are still many opportunities to improve on indige-
nous farming practices and to transfer successes in one area to
another. A growing body of evidence suggests that LEI tech-
niques can make significant yield gains possible.
• The International Center for Research in Agroforestry
(ICRAF) is working to combine the occasional use of
phosphate (say every five years) with fallows improved by
planting leguminous trees. Results from onfarm trials
show promising increases in maize yields, from 1 to 3 met-
ric tons per hectare applying modest amounts of phosphate
and from 3 to 6 metric tons per hectare when combined
with fallows planted to leguminous trees. (Results may
further improve by substituting leguminous plants for the
trees.) 
• Numerous nongovernmental organizations are promoting
LEI methods in Africa and have reported high yield
increases and favorable impacts. Yet because the evidence
is anecdotal and there are differences in measurement
methods, more research is needed to validate the findings. 
• As part of its research on less-favored lands in Africa,
IFPRI’s field surveys have found considerable variation
across communities and farms in their resource manage-
ment practices and yields. This suggests opportunities for
transferring knowledge from more successful communities
and farms to those less successful based on in-depth under-
standing of the reasons and the enabling conditions need-
ed for improved results. 
While LEI technologies could lead to significant produc-
tivity increases on many rainfed farms in Africa, there are some
important constraints to consider:
• Generating nitrogen and organic matter on the farm
requires additional land and labor. Smallholder farmers
have the labor but not the land. They cannot fallow or plant
cover crops on land they need to plant with food crops
each season. Nor are many farmers prepared to use their
available organic matter for soil improvement, because
they need it for household fuel. Farmers with larger hold-
ings may have the needed land, but face binding labor con-
straints. More research is needed to develop LEI technolo-
gies that not only increase yields, but also improve the pro-
ductivity of labor and land. This might well be possible,
especially as advances in biology enable plant characteris-
tics to be improved to generate more organic matter and
nitrogen and to heighten drought and pest resistance.
• Even where LEI technologies are successful, more is
needed to sustain agricultural productivity growth.
Longer-term growth requires improved germplasm that
thrives on the more fertile and moist soils that LEI can help
to create, as well as on supplementary inputs, especially
nitrogen. LEI technologies are a viable means of buying
time in rainfed areas. This time should be used to build the
infrastructure and support systems needed for a transition
to higher input systems over the longer haul. 
CONCLUSION
Globalization can offer significant growth opportunities for
many farmers in Asia, particularly in the context of rapidly
growing demand within the region for better foods. But if the
resulting growth is left to market forces alone, many of the
rural poor (especially smallholders and farmers in less-favored
regions) are likely to be left behind. The problem is even
greater in Africa where most farmers have limited access to
modern inputs and expanding markets and where growth in
national markets remains more stagnant. 
Governments have a key role to play in ensuring that glob-
alization benefits the rural poor. This role includes public
investments in agricultural research, developing rural infra-
structure, and investing in human development, especially in
less-favored areas. Finally, marketing institutions need to be
created to support smallholder farmers.  
For further reading see Peter Hazell, “Policies For Achieving
Food Security Without Degrading The Environment,” SCN News
No. 21, December 2000.
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SHAPING GLOBALIZATION FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATION
AND FOOD SECURITY
BACKGROUND
Technological development has historically been a powerful
driver of globalization, especially over the past two centuries.
In agriculture, in particular, technical change underpinned the
industrial revolution, improvements in nutrition, and a surge in
world population. Interactions between population increases
and technical changes in agriculture and industry, mostly since
the nineteenth century, converged to expand trade and flows of
finance and labor. These have been the essence of globaliza-
tion. The integration of the world economy would have been
impossible without the technological developments in agricul-
ture that proved wrong predictions of the inevitability of world
famine. Technology further supported significant improve-
ments in world food production and food security. Although
substantial numbers of people are still food insecure, this is due
not to lack of overall production but is related to the location of
production, income levels, and access to food by countries,
households, and individuals living on the edge of subsistence.
Since the 1960s, growth in world food supplies outpaced
even the unprecedented increases in food demand caused by
jumps in incomes and the doubling and redoubling of popula-
tion. Moreover, additional production came from virtually the
same cropland base: 1.4 billion hectares of land was planted to
crops in 1961 compared with the 1.5 billion hectares that in
1998 yielded twice the amount of grain and oilseeds. At 1960
crop yields, current levels of supply would likely have required
at least an additional 300 million hectares of land, an area equal
to the entire landmass of Western Europe. 
Food prices too have declined to their lowest levels in his-
tory. Consumers are able to eat better while spending less and
less of their budgets on food, diversifying demand for other
goods and services. Changes in demand have spurred coun-
tries’ specialization in production, fueling world trade and
investment flows.
The currently favorable dynamic balance between overall
food supply and demand was not inevitable, however. Nor
should it be taken for granted that the balance will persist with-
out public intervention. Progress in the past century resulted
from successful interaction between farmers, input suppliers,
and a publicly supported research and extension system that
furnished innovations and knowledge to the world for free.
Little land now remains on which to expand agricultural pro-
duction, so crop and livestock yields must continue to increase
for the next several decades. Production must be sustained, at
these much higher levels, for the foreseeable future in the face
of environmental, biological, and other factors that may under-
mine past gains. 
Continued strong performance in research and innovation
is thus essential to maintain favorable food balances over the
next half century. But the likelihood of achieving that must be
assessed against significant global changes in the amount and
sources of support for research, in public- and private-sector
roles, and in the balance between locally provided and interna-
tionally traded R&D goods and services (often discussed under
the rubric of the “globalization” of agricultural R&D). To con-
front the challenges of the next decades and the need for long-
term investment in R&D, one crucial issue (and the center of
one of the most heated controversies in the globalization
debate) is the positive and negative dynamics generated by the
changing intellectual property rights regimes associated with
the new international framework defined in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreements. 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ISSUES
National stocks of knowledge represent the accumulation of
findings from local research. But not all useful knowledge is
homegrown. In fact, the history of agriculture is a study in the
spillover effects of innovations. R&D spills across firms, sec-
tors of the economy, and countries. Though nations have some-
times monopolized key genetic resources, until recently agri-
cultural technologies (including new plant varieties and the
processes and parent material required to develop them) have
otherwise been unencumbered by proprietary claims and freely
available to all.
Beginning in the 1980s, a revolution occurred in the effec-
tive protection of proprietary claims, particularly in agricultur-
al biotechnology. This has boosted incentives for private-sector
investment. However, effective protection comes from patents,
which are a mixed blessing. Given the cumulative nature of
agricultural research, proliferation of patents makes it difficult
for public institutions and private start-ups to be active partici-
pants in biotechnology research. Moreover, the needs of indus-
try and agricultural progress are yet to be properly reconciled
with the rights of indigenous peoples and poor farmers who
maintained many of the landraces on which today’s improved
varieties depend.
The private sector tends to be most interested in widely
transferable or profitable near-market technologies. But much
research with high social value is not privately profitable
(largely because the benefits are not easily appropriable by the
innovator). Such research requires collective action by govern-
ments to help fund and even conduct it. Examples are basic and
pre-technology innovations and research that focuses on the
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and food-safety consequences of agriculture, and on the long-
term sustainability of agricultural systems.
In agricultural biotechnology, the most visible and contro-
versial field of agricultural research, the portion of the key
technology protected as intellectual property is now highly
concentrated in the hands of a small number of large, multina-
tional corporations based in North America and Western
Europe. Now, the very intellectual property rights that were
associated with the surge of private research in biotechnology
may block access to new developments by public-sector and
nonprofit researchers.
As patenting becomes more prevalent, the number of sep-
arate rights needed to produce a new innovation proliferates. If
ownership of these rights is diffuse and uncertain, the multilat-
eral bargaining problem can become difficult to resolve.
Instead of overexploitation of a common property with low
entry costs, there is underexploitation of a pool of intellectual
property due to the high costs of access—a manifestation of the
so-called “tragedy of the anti-commons” problem that plagues
not just agriculture but also health sciences research.
Recent work at IFPRI has addressed the question, “Does
the international proliferation of intellectual property rights and
regimes impede agricultural research conducted in, or of con-
sequence for, developing countries?” Answering this question
requires an understanding of the jurisdictional extent of intel-
lectual property, the geographic pattern of production, and the
extent and nature of South-North trade flows. Rights to intel-
lectual property are confined to the jurisdictions where they are
granted. There is no such thing as an international patent.
Gaining patent rights in the United States confers no intellectu-
al property rights in China; a patent in China must also be
sought and awarded to confer rights in that jurisdiction.
The extent of freedom to operate (the ability to practice or
use an innovation) in less-developed countries is not well
understood. For example, the recent vitamin-A rice innovation
reportedly required permission to practice over 70 patent
rights. The well-publicized donations made by major corpora-
tions of their relevant technologies left a strong impression that
enforcement of large numbers of crucial patents was being
relinquished in favor of the poor in developing countries. In
fact, in some major rice-consuming countries there are no valid
relevant patents. At most there are very few in the countries
where the majority of poor, malnourished consumers reside. 
Freedom to operate depends on specific circumstances.
IFPRI’s investigation of the intellectual property rights
assigned to the key enabling technologies used to transform
crops revealed that these rights are mainly held in, and there-
fore are primarily relevant to, rich-country jurisdictions. Thus,
for most of the staple crops that matter for food security in poor
countries, researchers’ freedom to operate in such nations is
currently not the main issue. Yet a problem could arise for
developing-country research on export-oriented cash crops
such as horticultural products, tropical beverages like coffee or
cocoa, and dessert bananas. Most certainly, a problem lies
ahead for research on some staple food crops as poorer devel-
oping countries move into compliance with their intellectual
property commitments to the WTO by the year 2005 and as
patent applications are increasingly lodged in developing coun-
tries. 
CONCLUSION
The challenge of increasing the world’s food supply capacity
has been met thus far. But it has not been permanently resolved.
Complacency about food supply capacity may be dangerous.
New crop varieties draw directly on breeding lines that were
developed decades, if not centuries or more, ago. This fact
underscores two key insights. First, progress in the agricultural
sciences is cumulative and sequential in nature. Second, the
distinction between the stocks of scientific knowledge and the
flows of research spending is important and underscores the
need for a long-term perspective on R&D spending and its
impacts on productivity and economic growth. Also, because
agricultural technologies must be adapted to agroecological
conditions, they are more location-specific than other tech-
nologies (for example, medical and information technologies).
So long-term planning cannot be left in the care of a few
wealthy nations following their own narrow self-interest.
The debate surrounding intellectual property rights and
globalization must be placed in that longer-term framework.
The role of the private sector in agricultural R&D is increasing.
But even more than in biomedical research, private investment
in agricultural R&D covers only a small subset of the needs and
is mostly a complement, not a substitute, for continued public
and other nonprofit research. For many developing countries,
the performance of the latter is now hampered more by lack of
funding than by intellectual property rights issues. Continued
strong performance of the public and nonprofit research system
is needed if world food requirements are to be satisfied over the
next several decades while sustaining and protecting the
resource base. Foresight is called for, because the lag between
investment and output is long.  
For further reading see E. Binenbaum, C. Nottenburg, P.G.
Pardey, B.D. Wright, and P. Zambrano, “South-North Trade,
Intellectual Property Jurisdictions, and Freedom to Operate in
Agricultural Research on Staple Crops,” EPTD Discussion Paper
No. 71 (Washington, D.C.: IFPRI, 2000), and C. Nottenburg, P.G.
Pardey, and B.D. Wright, “Accessing Other People’s Tech-
nologies: Do Non-Profit Agencies Need It? How to Obtain It,”
EPTD Discussion Paper (Washington, D.C.: IFPRI, forthcoming
2001).
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movements of hazardous waste (the Basel Convention), biodi-
versity loss (Convention on Biological Diversity), trade in
endangered species (Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora [CITES]), ozone
layer depletion (the Montreal Protocol), desertification (United
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification), and loss of wet-
lands (the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands). While it is not clear
that globalization per se has been a dominant factor in creating
the problems these initiatives address, some do relate to trade and
some are likely exacerbated by trade liberalization. There is thus
a growing sentiment that formal linkages should be strengthened
between the World Trade Organization (WTO) process and glob-
al environmental regulation. But obstacles remain, such as
resentment toward rich countries seeking to impose standards
that are at odds with economic conditions and social preferences
in poor countries. Moves to strengthen environmental regulation
as a pre-condition for trade are perceived largely as a guise by
which rich countries legitimize nontariff trade barriers.
Climate change is one of the most controversial global
issues. Although there are many uncertainties, studies suggest
that much of the world will be impacted increasingly by cli-
mate change linked to human-induced emission of greenhouse
gases. Not only are mean temperatures likely to rise, but also
the incidence and severity of extreme events such as heat
spells, droughts, and floods are expected to increase. Projected
climate change will not affect all countries equally however.
Global agricultural production appears to be sustainable in the
aggregate, but impacts on crop and livestock productivity will
vary considerably across regions. Successive studies suggest
that temperate areas (largely richer countries) stand to increase
their agricultural potential while that of many tropical and sub-
tropical areas will decline. The poorest countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa (already a hot region with large tracts of arid or
semiarid land) appear to be the most vulnerable to temperature
increases and changing rainfall patterns. Countries in South
and Southeast Asia could be affected by increasing irregularity
and intensity of tropical storms. The Pacific Island nations
could suffer losses of coastal land due to rising sea level, salt-
water intrusion into water supplies, and increased damage from
tropical storms. The anticipated disproportionate impact of cli-
mate change on the poorest countries means the number of peo-
ple at risk of hunger is also projected to rise, compared to a
baseline without climate change. 
FORCES FOR CHANGE
Asymmetries exist not only in the likely environmental impacts
of globalization on developed versus developing countries, but
also in the capacity of countries to mitigate or adapt to change or
to seek compensation. Most developing countries have only lim-
ited mechanisms by which communities can seek redress when
confronted with environmental externalities like water pollution
and increased flooding caused by activities upstream, or the loss
of food and fuelwood due to forest conversion. But externalities
may also have consequences far beyond the location of produc-
tion. When externalities “spill” across borders, such as green-
house gas emissions, ozone layer depletion, and biodiversity
loss—particularly extinction of species—the full force of inter-
national environmental advocacy is often mobilized. Global
grassroots activism now has a significant influence on interna-
tional trade dialogues, including their environmental aspects.
Recent developments in information and communication
technology are also shaping the debate on globalization and the
environment. The Internet and email are powerful tools for shar-
ing information among global communities, including scientists,
the private sector, policy analysts, community leaders, and envi-
ronmental activists. Information on best practices, technology,
institutional innovations, and specific environmental incidents
can be relayed rapidly the world over in photos, text, web links,
and sound bites. The enhanced flow of information is proving
particularly valuable to environmental advocacy and action
groups in developing countries. Access to information hitherto
unavailable nationally strengthens the capability of such organi-
zations, often nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), to raise
awareness and promote national debate on the plight of the envi-
ronment and the people whose livelihoods depend on it.
Mobilization of informal collective action in developing
countries is also proving effective. While studies of firm behavior
in developed countries cite regulatory pressure as the most potent
driver of environmentally preferred technical change, similar
studies in developing countries find community pressure to be the
predominant force. Increasingly too, the policies and practices of
multinational enterprises in developing countries are shaped by
(fear of) adverse media campaigns mounted by international
NGOs aimed at developed-country consumers and investors.
CONCLUSION
Global environmental issues, ranging from depletion of natural
resources and biodiversity to climate change, are complex.
Analyses of future trends are cloaked in uncertainties, given our
limited understanding of earth systems and their interactions with
changing economic and social conditions. Population growth,
shifting consumption patterns, and institutional innovation will
undoubtedly continue to affect the environment, as will the pace
and nature of technical change. There is reason to believe that
these changes will hasten the deterioration of environmental con-
ditions faced by already vulnerable populations in developing
countries. Such deterioration would likely reinforce vicious cycles
of humanitarian crises, conflict over resources, and lack of devel-
opment. To confront these pressing environmental challenges, a
concerted global effort is needed with rich countries taking the
lead and prepared to adopt a truly global vision. 
For further reading see T. Panayotou, Globalization and Environ-
ment, Working Paper No. 53, Center for International
Development (Cambridge, Mass., USA: Harvard University, 2000)
http://ideas.uqam.ca/ideas/data/Papers/wopcidhav53.html; 
O. Solbrig, R. Paarlberg, and F. di Castri, eds., Globalization and
the Rural Environment (Harvard University Press, 2001); and 
S. Retallack, “Economic Globalization and the Environment,”
Transnational Associations 4 (2000) (http://www.uia.org/uiata/retal-
lack004.htm). 
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G
lobalization affects the environment in several ways. It
changes the structure and pace of economic growth and,
hence, the scale and nature of resource consumption and waste
emission. It also fosters the creation of regulatory frameworks and
institutions for promoting trade, the flow of capital, and the diffu-
sion of technology, in ways that can exacerbate or mitigate envi-
ronmental impacts. Environmental impacts may be felt locally,
affecting those who earn their livelihood by exploiting resources
such as land, water, and biodiversity. Or they may be felt further
afield, through broader effects on natural ecosystems, the freshwa-
ter cycle, the ozone layer, nutrient flows, the climate, and so on.
There are thus sound economic as well as humanitarian and ethical
reasons to map the impacts of globalization on the environment.
Evidence supports the notion that open and transparent
economies are more likely to be prosperous. Yet measures of
prosperity rarely account for environmental costs of produc-
tion. Some argue that depletion of natural resources, pollution
of air, water, and soil, loss of biodiversity, and global warming
significantly reduce and in some circumstances outweigh the
growth-related benefits of globalization. Furthermore, econom-
ic and environmental costs and benefits may not be equitably
distributed if the lion’s share of economic benefits from glob-
alization accrues to developed countries, while the developing
world shoulders the environmental burdens.
ENVIRONMENT, GROWTH, AND COMPETITIVENESS
Trade generates economic benefits because, given free and effi-
cient markets, it encourages trading partners to specialize in
goods or services they have some comparative advantage in.
Since developing countries often have abundant natural
resources and cheap, plentiful labor, trade liberalization has fos-
tered shifts toward labor- and resource-intensive sectors such as
mining, logging, garment manufacturing, and export crop pro-
duction. Most of these sectors, however, generate significant
environmental “externalities.” These are environmental costs not
reflected in the production costs of individual enterprises, be they
farm households or multinational companies. The results of
ignoring the true social costs of production are excessive pro-
duction, resource consumption, and waste emission.
Proponents of globalization argue that many environmental
problems can be countered by stimulating economic growth. A
portion of the overall economic gain can be transferred to indi-
viduals and communities affected by environmental degradation.
Investments can be made to strengthen environmental institutions,
and cleaner, more resource-efficient technologies can be devel-
oped and adopted. Based on studies of developed countries, pro-
ponents also point to the so-called “inverted-U” phenomenon.
That is, although natural resource consumption and degradation
increase as economies grow, an income threshold is attained
above which demand for a better environment stimulates invest-
ment in environmental protection and rehabilitation. Degradation
is thus reduced. Many developing countries, however, are so poor,
population growth so high, and natural resources already so
stressed, that catastrophic, perhaps irreversible, environmental
damage may well occur long before any such threshold is reached.
Although environmental damage can be a by-product of
globalization and trade liberalization, incentives for addressing
its underlying causes are mixed. While developing countries suf-
fer the greatest damage, they are also under the greatest pressure
to accelerate economic growth to increase incomes and combat
poverty. And since environmental policies and institutions are
likely to be weak in developing countries, producers there (be
they domestic or foreign) have little incentive to care about the
environmental externalities of their actions. Rampant logging of
the world’s biodiversity- and carbon-rich tropical forests, for
example, testifies to this. This raises concerns that globalization
might create “pollution havens” in developing countries, where
foreign investors operate to escape stricter environmental laws
and enforcement in their own countries. There are also fears that
governments might progressively push environmental standards
lower as they compete to attract scarce foreign investment (the
“race to the bottom” hypothesis). Available evidence suggests
that such fears might be overstated. Foreign investors are gener-
ally much more concerned with factors such as wage rates, avail-
able infrastructure, and the repatriation of earnings.
Some governments’ adoption of lenient environmental standards
raises concerns that these countries are, in effect, subsidizing
exports and reducing the competitiveness of producers in coun-
tries with stricter standards. Attempts to raise environmental
standards bring protests from domestic producers who are con-
cerned about potentially higher production costs and loss of
international competitiveness. Politicians express concern too
about increasing domestic prices in the face of widespread
poverty. Furthermore, developing countries maintain that differ-
ences in resource endowment, pollution assimilation capacities,
and social preferences with regard to environmental standards
are legitimate sources of their comparative advantage.
Attempting to reconcile such conflicting interests poses enor-
mous challenges to environmental policymakers. 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
Despite the political and technical difficulties involved, the
international community has proven willing to take collective
action to address environmental issues of global concern.
International initiatives have been mounted on climate change
(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change),
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DEMOCRACY ANDCIVILSOCIETY
SHAPING GLOBALIZATION FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATION
AND FOOD SECURITY
G
lobalization is generally perceived as a fundamental
change in human interactions, but precisely what has
changed and how it has changed are matters of contention.
Some maintain that the changes are mainly related to the emer-
gence of transnational economic and political organizations,
while others emphasize the role of dramatic improvements in
communications—with the Internet, mobile phones, and satel-
lite networks shrinking space and time. Although some argue
that globalization is economically driven, its political, cultural,
and technological processes are equally important.
Globalization is a complex, contradictory process that simulta-
neously involves increased diversity and homogenization, frag-
mentation and integration, and localism/regionalism and inter-
nationalism. This brief illustrates some of these contradictions
as they have emerged in the areas of democracy, social capital,
and social movements in developing countries, emphasizing
their relationship with poverty and food security.
DEMOCRACY AND GLOBALIZATION
Democracy is important for food security in a number of ways—
it helps ensure a government’s commitment to famine preven-
tion, for example. India’s success in conquering its vulnerability
to famines has been attributed to two key elements: a vigilant
press (to disseminate information about impending food crises)
and free elections (to ensure the government’s accountability to
its electorate). Recent research has also documented the positive
impact of democracy on declines in child malnutrition.
Democracy has made remarkable progress during the past
30 years, especially in the developing world—a change that has
been strongly influenced by the evolution of global communi-
cations. Authoritarian regimes, based on control of informa-
tion, have no future in a framework of open communication:
access to information helps citizens gain greater awareness and
enables increased participation. 
But not all information is equally helpful, nor do all actors
have equal access to information resources. Consequently, dif-
ferent groups of people have different opportunities to mobilize
and to make their voices heard. Information technologies main-
ly are designed for developed countries, making it hard for poor
people in developing countries to benefit from them because
they lack the necessary literacy and live mostly in rural areas,
where telecommunication facilities are far less available than in
urban areas. Poor women benefit even less than poor men.
Such exclusion means that the poor are at risk of being cut off
from the global conversation. 
There is also increasing concern that the new wave of
democracy might face reversals, as indicated by the recent rise
of populism in some countries in Latin America and Asia, and
the persistence of single political parties in parts of Africa.
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND GLOBALIZATION
Social capital is a type of social organization based on networks
with common norms and mutual trust that pursue common
goals. Studies in different developing countries show that soci-
eties with strong social capital tend to do well economically
and can reduce their poverty levels. In addition, several studies
on rural development have shown that indigenous or locally
created associations can be essential for growth as well as food
security. Globalization affects social capital in multiple ways,
and the question is whether societies gain or lose from
increased exposure to external forces and ideas. Some societies
may lose traditional values, norms, and networks without mak-
ing further progress. In other societies, new practices brought
by globalization may transform “dysfunctional” traditional
groups into more productive ones.
A study of an industrial sector in Kerala, India, illus-
trates the successful establishment of new social capital
influenced by global ideologies such as democracy at both
the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, the state gov-
ernment transformed the traditional vertical political struc-
ture into a more horizontal network and encouraged social
mobilization by creating strong and effective legal systems.
With this governmental support, the power of the lower class
at the micro level was strengthened through labor unions and
class mobilization. This contributed significantly to trans-
forming traditional relationships with the local elite and
improving the welfare of the poor.
Another example of an effective social network is the
Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), which oper-
ates in Gujarat, India. SEWA began by organizing textile
workers, then applied and modified the lessons learned to
mobilize women in the informal sector, helping them achieve
some power over their work situation. Its efforts bring
together three movements: the labor movement, the coopera-
tive movement, and the women’s movement. SEWA’s philos-
ophy vis-à-vis globalization is pragmatic, supporting trade
liberalization in some cases and opposing it in others,
depending on whether the effects are beneficial or damaging
to the poor.
In the case of SEWA and similar initiatives, the avail-
ability of the Internet and other new communication tech-
nologies has played a crucial role in promoting effective par-
ticipation of the poor. These experiences show that there are
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Grameen Telecom, a branch of the Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh, provides another good example. Founded in
1996, Grameen Telecom has sought to make telephone serv-
ice available throughout Bangladesh. It does this by loaning
money for the purchase of cellular phones to women recruit-
ed from among the Grameen Bank’s borrowers. After the
women purchase a phone on credit, they make telephone
service available to an entire village, charging villagers for
phone use. The project helps the rural poor of Bangladesh not
only by providing better access to information, but also by
offering low-income women good opportunities for income
generation.
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND TRANSNATIONAL
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Environmental changes, fluctuations in the global economy, and
developments in global technologies do not respect the bound-
aries of nations. Nations remain powerful, but because of global
forces there are large gaps opening up between their govern-
ments and citizens. This makes sovereignty a fuzzy concept.
Much of the current debate on globalization and social
movements focuses on the concept of a global civil society—
a society in which networks and movements provide a voice
for individuals in the global arena. Referring mainly to inde-
pendent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and to
social movements that operate across national boundaries,
the concept and the forms it embodies are viewed by some as
the necessary response to a more globalized world.
The term civil society is often associated with the abili-
ty to control the circumstances in which individuals live and
the substantive empowerment of citizens. But do these new
global forms of organizing allow the poorest countries—and,
more importantly, the most marginalized and vulnerable
groups in a country—to have equal participation in civil soci-
ety? Globalization offers conflicting opportunities to social
movements. On the one hand, it provides them with signifi-
cant new possibilities and resources for influencing both
state and nonstate actors. On the other hand, to the extent that
globalization appears to reduce the ability of states to act
within their own territories, it means that social movements
must direct resources toward international linkages and part-
nerships that may diminish their autonomy or their effective-
ness in their home country. Some would argue, for example,
that small NGOs supporting poor communities in developing
countries need to work on very specific local issues—that
they have neither the time nor the resources to engage in
more global concerns.
The difficulty of shaping a common agenda that respects
the needs and interests of all participants in transnational
movements is also an important issue. In the women’s move-
ment, for example, there have been notable difficulties in
developing a shared global perspective on economic change.
Tensions result from the fact that the economic interests of
women in developing countries can conflict directly with
those of women in developed countries. Acknowledging the
complicity of women in the North in the suffering of women
in the South has been a challenge: the preservation of
women’s consumption standards and employment in the
North, for example, results in environmental damage or loss
of women’s labor rights in the South. Similarly, during the
protests in Seattle, the wide range of civil-society organiza-
tions that were represented—trade unions, environmental
activists, farmers’ associations, women’s groups, campaign-
ers for social justice—often had very diverse views and aims.
Moreover, the NGOs present came predominantly from the
North, while civil society from the South was underrepre-
sented.
More inclusive methods of mobilization are needed to
ensure greater participation by developing countries—an
outcome that might result in a different way of tackling
social and environmental conditions. The use of a common
label (“civil society”) should not obscure the heterogeneity
of interests and objectives across groups and countries, and
the need to deal in a democratic way with those differences.
Globalization can provide the poor with opportunities
for mobilization, for strengthening democratic institutions,
and for making their voices heard. But it does not come with-
out risks, perhaps the greatest of which is the potential for
marginalizing the poorest and most vulnerable segments of
society. The outcome will depend, to a great extent, on devel-
opments in civil society and the ways that can be found to
promote greater accountability and global responsiveness to
the needs of the poor in developing countries.  
For further reading see L.J. Camp and B. Anderson, “Grameen
Phone: Empowering the Poor through Connectivity,” IMP: The
Magazine on Information Impacts (December 1999)
(http://www.cisp.org/imp); J. Dreze and A. Sen, Hunger and
Public Action (Oxford University Press, 1991); F. Fukuyama,
“Social Capital and Civil Society” 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/fukuy
ama.htm [1999]); A. Goetz, “Lobbying for Economic Justice:
Women’s Movements and the World Bank” (Institute of
Development Studies, Sussex, UK, 1999); P. Heller, “Social Capital
as a Product of Class Mobilization and State Intervention:
Industrial Workers in Kerala, India,” World Development 24
(1996); M. Kaldor, “‘Civilizing’ Globalization? The Implications
of the ‘Battle in Seattle’”(http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global
[2000]); and Self Employed Women’s Association website
(http://www.sewa.org).
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market, which makes it easier for Sierra Leone, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and Sudan to sell petroleum, minerals,
or gum Arabic to finance weapon purchases and intensify civil
wars. The toll in the Congo alone includes three million deaths
in three years, 6.5 million people in need of humanitarian assis-
tance, and over a million displaced people. In 1995–99, legal
arms suppliers sold Africa $2.5 billion worth of weapons, with
the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council –
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States – providing 60 percent. In Colombia, Myanmar, and
Afghanistan, narcotics production for the world market, armed
violence, and food insecurity are tightly linked.
Information and communication technologies work in both
Mexico’s Zapatista Liberation Front garnered worldwide atten-
tion and aid for the plight of the country’s indigenous people via
the Internet, while Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front
coordinates military operations, diamond sales, and arms pur-
chases via satellite phone from bases in the country’s hinterland.
NO CONSENSUS AMONG ANALYSTS
Consensus continues to elude scholars and policy analysts as to
whether economic ties foster peace. One school of thought asserts
that as a web of economic relationships entangles nations, the costs
of going to war become prohibitive. Some empirical studies sup-
port this proposition. Also, there are well-known cases where
weak economic ties prevail between countries experiencing hostil-
ities. India and Pakistan, for example, share one of the world’s
tensest borders but engage in very little trade with one another. 
Other analysts insist that the peace-through-trade notion
must be seriously qualified. They argue that trade reduces con-
flict incentives only when partners enjoy relatively symmetric
economic and military relations. For example, although Taiwan
and China have extensive trade links, and Taiwan has invested
tens of billions of dollars in China, the threat of cross-Strait
violence remains considerable. The economic relationship is
unmistakably dominated by Taiwan, whereas China is pressing
to establish military superiority.
Research to date has focused on globalization’s effects in
mitigating interstate conflict. Few studies examine the relation-
ship between globalization and civil war, which is much more
salient for today’s policymakers. One well-known study, fund-
ed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, found a strong
relationship between openness to the global economy and
reduced risk of civil war. This report concluded that trade
promotion policies could help prevent conflicts.
Other research qualifies this conclusion, pointing out that
trade’s effects in reducing the likelihood of civil war depend on
internal distribution, as well as the nature of the relationship
between trade and investment partner nations. High levels of
inequality associated with conflict. And trade may exacerbate
existing inequalitydepending on how it is carried out. A World
Bank study found that low per capita income, negative eco-
nomic growth, and high dependence on primary commodity
exports are  a recipe for civil war. 
Analyses of the causes of the 1994 Rwandan genocide
provide evidence on this point. The country relied heavily on
coffee exports for hard currency and government revenues. The
collapse of world prices in the early 1990s led to high unem-
ployment, reduced farm incomes, reduced social spending, and
a citizenry receptive to government incitement of ethnic and
political violence.
RECONNOITERING PEACE AND FOOD SECURITY 
Violence in developing countries stems from a constellation of
factors. Ethnic rivalries and environmental scarcities are among
them, as are structural factors in which globalization may be
implicated. Groups may compete, for example, over resources
such as development aid and commodities in demand on world
markets. Often pressed into service by national leaders seeking
control over natural and human resources, individual combatants
still fight to maintain human dignity and a decent standard of liv-
ing. Policies aimed at reducing conflict should encourage coop-
eration among rival groups and reduce real and perceived
scarcities. The ways aid is delivered in conflict-prone areas are
also crucial. Development assistance, including agricultural
investment, can deter conflict where it is integrated in the
construction of social contexts that promote equity.
Global investors, whether private or public (aid donors),
need to emphasize conflict prevention as part of the develop-
ment agenda if they are to expect positive returns. Developing
countries need peace to achieve more food-secure outlooks and
to reap potential benefits of globalization.  
A number of recent developments may advance globalization’s
peaceful potential:
• debt relief, which will free resources for investment in
human security,
•  efforts through the U.N. system to improve data collection
on food insecurity among vulnerable groups, in order to
facilitate improved international response to famine and 
  chronic undernutrition, and
•  emergence of broad civil society coalitions that seek, inter alia, 
to refocus globalizattion in ways that promote peace and equity.
Further, donors must allocate humanitarian aid where it is
needed most, which may mean more aid to Africa and less to
the former Yugoslavia. Global trade and investment agree-
ments must take into account their potential to fuel conflict.
Improved codes of conduct and control regimes governing
trade in conventional weapons are essential, as are equitable
international frameworks to reduce the flows of diamonds,
drugs, and fossil fuels that generate resources for war.  
More research is needed to bolster policies that foster
peace. In particular, work should focus on the relationship
between food insecurity and conflict and on the circumstances
under which globalization contributes to peace.
Future connections among globalization, food insecurity,
and conflict are likely to play out at multiple social and politi-
cal. Foresight and planning, based in part on hindsight and
lessons from history, can help to make the world more peaceful
and secure. Careful monitoring is needed of the likely and
actual local food security impacts of international trade and aid,
both within and beyond the food economy. 
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CONFLICT ANDFOODINSECURITY
SHAPING GLOBALIZATION FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATION
AND FOOD SECURITY
F
or more than two centuries, proponents and critics of an
open global economy have debated whether free flows of
goods, services, and capital make the world more or less peace-
ful. One view is that as nations increase their commercial,
financial, communication, and cultural ties, they are less likely
to go to war. The opposing view holds that world economic lib-
eralization worsens inequality within and between nations,
with strife and violence the inevitable result.
Globalization has replaced the Cold War as the central
organizing principle of international relations. Whether it is
likely to make the world more or less peaceful, therefore, has
enormous implications for food security. Globalization is not
just the intensified integration of global markets and informa-
tion exchange, but also the expansion of international norms
and institutions that can dampen or heighten conflict-hunger
dynamics. 
CONFLICT IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 
In late 2000, armed conflicts worldwide left 24 million people
in 28 developing and transition countries and territories in need
of food and other humanitarian assistance (see box). Nearly 80
percent of these people were in Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover,
globally, women and children make up 70–80 percent of the
refugees and internally displaced people uprooted by violence.
War’s impact on food security is profound. According to
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, in 1990–97, conflict-induced losses of agricultural
output in Africa totaled US $22 billion, a sum equivalent to
a third of the aid received by the conflict countries and far in
excess of foreign direct investment flows (see our Food from
Peace, 2020 Discussion Paper No. 24 and Brief No. 50 for
more detail on the losses to food production attributable to
conflict). Compounding the effects, in almost all the affected
countries, the majority of the workforce depends on agricul-
ture for its livelihood.  
Analysts pointing to the pacifying effects of globaliza-
tion note that both the number and intensity of conflicts
between nation-states declined after the Cold War. But inter-
nal conflicts proliferated in the early 1990s, with the total
number of conflicts in 1999 (37) well above the figure for
1965–70.  The distinction between internal and interstate
warfare has also blurred. Twenty-two years of civil war in
Afghanistan have featured significant U.S., Pakistani, Soviet,
Tajik, and Uzbek intervention. Internal conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) is
“Africa’s World War,” with the intervention of Angola,
Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. 
GLOBALIZATION: INSTITUTIONS FOR PEACE OR
COMMODITIES FOR ARMS?
Clearly the integration of global markets, combined with devel-
opments in information and communication technologies and
transportation, could potentially deter conflict. At a minimum,
the capacity to monitor the early warning signs of famine and
to move humanitarian aid quickly has greatly improved. Yet
this development alone cannot ensure peace without the politi-
cal will to prevent and resolve conflicts. Furthermore, global-
ization is not just about markets or flows of labor and capital.
Global institutions that uphold consensual humanitarian norms,
such as the convention banning land mines, the new
International Criminal Court, and the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights framework on the right to food play an active
but as yet insufficient role in reducing the destructive forces
that produce food insecurity.
Since 1991, military-humanitarian interventions author-
ized by the United Nations in Iraqi Kurdistan, Somalia, and the
former Yugoslavia have demonstrated the international com-
munity’s willingness to intervene to uphold the right to food
and emergency aid, even over the objections of a sovereign
government when that government is implicated in creating the
crisis. However, such intervention remains ad hoc. The inter-
national community has stood aside in other food wars in
Rwanda, the Congo, and East Timor. 
Some aspects of globalization clearly facilitate conflict.
The integration of global markets includes a $40 billion arms
According to U.N. data and the U.S. Committee for
Refugees, in November 2000, 23.5 million people were in
need of humanitarian assistance due to conflict:
18.5 in Angola, Burundi, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo
(Kinshasa), Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire (refugees and inter-
nally displaced people), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya (refugees),
Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania
(refugees), Uganda and Zambia (refugees) 
3.2 million in the Afghanistan region (Afghanistan, Iran,
and Pakistan), Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Indonesia,
Russia (Chechnya region), Tajikistan, and the Palestinian
territories territories; and
1.8 million in Colombia
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essential. Rich nations must also ensure that their firms abide
by anti-bribery codes and that there are no safe havens for
money laundering, while strongly supporting anticorruption
efforts in developing countries. 
Environment. Global environmental concerns, from cli-
mate change to stressed ecosystems, are complex and address-
ing them will involve tangible costs. But costs and uncertain-
ties should not obscure their important implications for the
food security, health, and nutrition of the world’s poor.
Deteriorating environmental conditions may reinforce vicious
cycles of conflict over resources and humanitarian crises, and
the poor will pay the higher price. Complaints in industrialized
countries about developing countries enjoying unfair trade
advantages from presumed lax environmental regulations
(which, if true, would have only local effects) appear inconse-
quential when compared to the larger responsibilities of rich
countries in shaping global environmental conditions that may
adversely affect some of the poorest of the planet. 
Technology and public goods. Expansion of adaptive
research on agricultural technology—biotechnology in particu-
lar—that focuses on the needs of poor farmers and consumers
in developing countries can contribute to enhanced food secu-
rity, nutrition, and health. Yet, during the 1990s, growth in
investment in agricultural research in and for developing coun-
tries stalled, and for some regions even decreased.
Industrialized countries can help by fostering a serious debate
over environmental, health, ethical, and equity concerns with
respect to both agricultural biotechnology and agricultural
research in general. Most importantly, they can provide scien-
tific and financial support for technology development in poor
countries and facilitate creative public-private partnerships.
Similar arguments apply to research on health issues that over-
whelmingly affect the world’s poor. Finally, the proper balance
between public- and private-sector concerns about intellectual
property rights continues to be debated, indicating the need to
explore that relationship further.
POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS 
Establishing viable political coalitions, domestic and interna-
tional, to sustain the needed institutional and financial commit-
ments is just as important as defining adequate policies. The
notion of supporting globalization with appropriate comple-
mentary policies (as suggested in this brief) is not universally
accepted. Some have argued that globalization erodes the fiscal
resources of the state, undermining the implementation of nec-
essary policies just when funds are needed to help people
affected by their integration into the international economy. 
More fundamentally, several critics of globalization con-
sider participation in the international economy as the root of
all problems. Some see the world as monolithically controlled
by powerful governments and corporations, with poverty
resulting from a chain of international exploitation that leads
from the very poor to the very rich.  In a different but political-
ly more powerful tradition, protectionists and isolationists join
forces, based on narrow views of economic and national self-
interest, to oppose the process of global integration and the
establishment of better institutions of global governance.
The current discussion echoes arguments after World War
II.  Having experienced the horror of two global wars and the
Great Depression, the world needed an international architec-
ture to prevent similar tragedies. Economic nationalists, how-
ever, wanted to reduce foreign ties through protectionism. The
left, in the Leninist tradition, believed that the expansion of
capitalism worldwide could only lead to more crises and war
among the imperialist powers. Political nationalists advocated
isolationism and unilateralism in foreign affairs, always fretting
about possible losses of sovereignty. Outside the United States,
there were also voices that criticized an international system
that was perceived as an instrument of political and economic
domination by the economic superpower emerging from the
wreckage of World War II. Similar arguments appear in today’s
debate on globalization. But, now as then, global problems
require global approaches and institutions. Protectionism, iso-
lationism, and unilateralism will not solve them. 
The optimistic view of globalization begins by recognizing
that the process of world economic integration has generated
levels of wealth never seen before, potentially providing the
resources with which to confront global poverty and hunger.
Another encouraging trend is the worldwide advance of
democracy since the 1980s, in part influenced by the global-
ization of information. New communication technologies have
eroded the information monopoly of nondemocratic political
systems, and abuses of power and corruption that went unno-
ticed before are being exposed. Better communications have
also linked societies more closely, with international alliances
being formed to confront global concerns. The notion of mono-
lithic corporate control is contradicted by obvious differences
in interests and behavior among corporations, opening the way
for different coalitions, as shown on a variety of issues, from
climate change to affordable drugs. 
Just as the expansion of markets and democracy in the
developed countries over the past 50 years increased welfare
and helped reconcile conflicting social interests, the world can
now move in the same direction, beginning with a concerted
effort to combat hunger and poverty. In addition to the obvious
and compelling humanitarian arguments, enlightened self-
interest also dictates the need to do so. Poor developing coun-
tries continue to spawn health, environmental, military, and
humanitarian crises, while poverty and hunger deprive the
world of the creative potential and economic contribution of
billions of human beings.
CONCLUSION
The latest wave of globalization has lifted human welfare to
levels never experienced before. It has helped create enormous
wealth. The persistence of poverty and hunger amidst affluence
is an avoidable moral tragedy and a drag on the world econo-
my. Poverty and hunger are problems that can be addressed, if
humanity, particularly those better off, can summon the politi-
cal will to do so. 
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T
he wave of globalization that began in the 19
th century was
driven by technological changes in transport and commu-
nications, population growth, and migration. It ended in global
war and economic collapse. The current wave of globalization,
driven in part by similar forces, appears to be more enduring
and to be associated with trends toward participatory govern-
ment and economic development. The briefs in this collection
have described the welfare-enhancing aspects of globalization
today, but they have also sketched scenarios in which vulnera-
ble groups may be hurt. The authors have emphasized the need
for complementary domestic and international policies to
ensure that those vulnerable groups, particularly the food-inse-
cure and the poor, benefit from a more integrated world. This
brief concludes by looking at governance and public policy
issues to achieve the objective of substantially alleviating, or
eliminating, hunger and poverty in a globalized world.  
POLICY RESPONSE TO POVERTY AND HUNGER
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Effective domestic policies in developing countries are key for
growth, poverty alleviation, and food security. These policies
include maintaining a stable macroeconomic framework; pro-
moting open and competitive markets; ensuring good gover-
nance, transparency, and the rule of law; implementing pro-
grams and investments that expand opportunities for all, with
special consideration for vulnerable groups; and providing ade-
quate safety nets. 
Because three-quarters of the world’s poor depend direct-
ly or indirectly on agriculture, rural development has to be
given special attention. Some have argued that increased agri-
cultural trade protection in developing countries would ease
poverty and promote food security. But this would be equiva-
lent to a regressive tax on food consumption, which would
harm poor consumers and mostly benefit large agricultural
producers. A better approach for developing countries is to
eliminate policy biases against agriculture; increase invest-
ments in health, education, and human capital in general;
improve management of land and water resources; facilitate
land ownership by small producers and landless workers; pro-
mote improved agricultural technology, rural infrastructure,
and nonagricultural rural enterprises; and encourage organiza-
tions to expand the social capital and political participation for
small producers and the poor. Food security in developing
countries also requires equitable economic growth and appro-
priate food use, which depend on empowerment of women,
health and education investments, and better governance.
Developing countries may also need policy instruments to pro-
tect the livelihoods of the rural poor from import surges, and,
in the current World Trade Organization (WTO) agricultural
negotiations, they may legitimately insist that industrialized
countries first reduce their higher levels of subsidization and
protection of agriculture. 
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
Industrialized nations set the global economic, political, and
environmental agenda and context. They therefore cannot
evade their responsibility to make this world a better place,
especially for the poor. A number of broad policy issues require
attention.
Trade liberalization in products of interest to developing
countries. Low-income countries have historically faced high
trade barriers in industrialized countries in products such as
agriculture and textiles that best reflect the developing world’s
human and natural resource endowments. The Uruguay Round
began to address some of the imbalances that developing coun-
tries suffer in international trade, but it did not rectify them.
Efforts to rectify those imbalances should continue.  In partic-
ular, current negotiations must eliminate the combination of
agricultural protectionism and high subsidies in industrialized
countries that has limited agricultural growth in the developing
world and weakened food security in vulnerable countries by
putting their domestic production at a disadvantage. 
International capital and aid flows. The last 20 years have
witnessed serious international financial crises, several of
which arose from policy changes in industrialized countries
that affected exchange rates, interest rates, and capital flows,
with destabilizing effects on weaker countries. Although devel-
oping countries must reduce their vulnerability through better
macroeconomic and financial policies, these may not be
enough if at the same time the main industrialized countries do
not foster world financial stability with adequate macroeco-
nomic policies. Moreover, the poorest countries, lacking access
to international capital markets, need resources through aid
flows. They would benefit from the acceleration and expansion
of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) and the
implementation, and future increase, of aid targets by donor
countries. Finally, international financial institutions should
increase funding for rural and agricultural development, pover-
ty alleviation, and health and nutrition interventions.
Peace, democracy, and good governance. Continued
international diplomatic and political engagement and financial
support is crucial to bring peace and reconciliation to countries
affected by conflict and to sustain fragile transitions toward
democracy. Otherwise, regional security problems and human-
itarian crises will keep recurring. Improved codes of conduct
and regimes governing trade in conventional weapons appear
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GOVERNMENTS ANDPUBLICPOLICY
SHAPING GLOBALIZATION FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATION
AND FOOD SECURITY